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ABSTRACT
Despite the recognized impact that the national administrative state
has had on the federal system, the relationship between federalism
and administrative law remains strangely inchoate and unanalyzed.
Recent Supreme Court case law suggests that the Court is increasingly
focused on this relationship and is using administrative law to address
federalism concerns even as it refuses to curb Congress’s regulatory
authority on constitutional grounds. This Article explores how
administrative law may be becoming the new federalism and assesses
how well-adapted administrative law is to performing this role. It
argues that administrative law has important federalism-reinforcing
features and represents a critical approach for securing the continued
vibrancy of federalism in the world of administrative governance. It
further defends this use of administrative law as constitutionally
legitimate. The Article concludes with suggestions for how the Court
should develop administrative law’s federalism potential.
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INTRODUCTION
Few doubt the tremendous impact that the modern
administrative state has had on the nation’s federal system. Congress
and the president have long acknowledged the relationship between
federalism and administrative government, incorporating the states as
1
central players in major federal regulatory schemes. Scholars, too,
have taken heed. In particular, federalism scholarship’s growing
fixation with preemption has underscored the effect of federal
2
administrative action on the states. Recent aggressive efforts by
federal agencies to preempt state law, especially state tort law, have
brought to the fore the crucial link between federalism and
3
administrative government.
Such administrative preemption
1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000) (granting states the primary responsibility for
implementing the Clean Air Act); see also infra text accompanying notes 111–13 (discussing
congressional and executive measures aimed at protecting states from federal agency
intrusions).
2. As evidence of this fixation, the period 2007–2008 has witnessed publication of three
prominent works on preemption: FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL
INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007), PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF PREEMPTION’S CORE QUESTIONS (William W. Buzbee ed.,
forthcoming 2008), and THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR (forthcoming 2008),
in addition to numerous articles on the topic from a variety of perspectives (empirical, doctrinal,
historical).
3. See, e.g., 6 C.F.R. § 27.405(a) (2008) (stating, in a provision of a Department of
Homeland Security regulation on Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, that any state
law, regulation, administrative action, or state court decision based on state law that “conflicts
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threatens to impose significant burdens on the ability of states to
exercise independent regulatory authority, a core concern of
4
federalism.
Nonetheless, the relationship between federalism and federal
administrative law remains strangely inchoate and unanalyzed.
Administrative law’s constitutional dimensions—in particular,
doctrines of separation of powers and procedural due process—are
5
generally recognized to have significant federalism implications. But
more run-of-the-mill administrative law concerns—such as whether
an agency adequately followed required procedures, engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking, or deserves judicial deference with respect
to its statutory interpretations—are rarely viewed through a
federalism lens. This is all the more surprising given the current focus
on preemption because despite their importance to federalism,
preemption determinations are understood as turning on questions of

with, hinders, poses an obstacle to or frustrates the purposes of this regulation” is preempted);
12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006) (stating in effect, in an Office for the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) rule, that state supervision of state-chartered subsidiaries of national banks is
preempted); Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed.
Reg. 13,472, 13,496–97 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633) (stating, in the preamble
to a final Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) rule on mattress safety, that the
standard would preempt “non-identical state requirements which seek to reduce the risk of . . .
mattress fires”); Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Prods., 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,933–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, and 601) (stating in the preamble to a final Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
rule on drug labeling that the FDA views its approval of a prescription drug label as preempting
not just state regulations but also state tort law); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof
Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223, 49,246 (Aug. 23, 2005) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571)
(containing a proposed National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rule for
improving roof strength performance in rollover crashes and stating that, if adopted, the rule
“would preempt all conflicting State common law requirements, including rules of tort law”). A
number of articles have discussed these regulations. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1553–
54, 1573–75 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227, 229–42 (2007). In addition, these
regulations led to a Senate hearing on preemption. See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal
Agencies Usurping Congressional and State Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2–3 (2007).
4. In this Article, I use “federalism,” “federalism concerns,” and “state interests” to refer
primarily to protecting the ability of the states to exercise meaningful regulatory power in their
own right. Others have similarly identified preserving state regulatory autonomy as central to
the project of federalism. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1, 13–15, 23–36 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1995); Bradford R. Clark, Separation
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1328–31, 1430–33 (2001).
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statutory interpretation rather than constitutional law. To be sure,
the focus on preemption has sparked much discussion of the extent to
which administrative agencies should be able to determine the
preemptive scope of federal law. Yet few legal scholars have gone
beyond the administrative preemption debate to consider the broader
relationship between federalism and federal administrative law.
Moreover, within this debate the focus has been on the tensions
between federalism and administrative law, with little attention paid
7
to the potential synergies between the two.
Recent Supreme Court case law suggests that this curtain on the
relationship between federalism and administrative law may be
lifting. In a number of decisions, the Court has demonstrated an
unwillingness to impose significant constitutional limits on the
substantive scope of Congress’s regulatory powers. Yet it has also
indicated that federalism concerns about protecting the states’
independent regulatory role retain traction. The vehicle by which the
Court appears to be addressing such concerns, however, is
administrative law. Acting ostensibly through the rubric of standard
administrative law doctrines, such as reasoned decisionmaking
requirements and the established framework for review of agency
statutory interpretations, the Court has ensured that the impact of
challenged agency decisions on the states is considered. As a result,
administrative law may be becoming the home of a new federalism.
These moves toward transforming administrative law into a
federalism vehicle remain largely undeveloped. The Court has not yet
articulated a coherent account of how federalism and administrative
law should be integrated; indeed, it has not acknowledged that such
an account may be needed or even explicitly viewed its recent efforts
in this light. Suggestions that administrative law may be the new
federalism are present in only a handful of decisions, too few to draw
any reliable inferences of a new doctrinal trend. Moreover, all of
these decisions were highly contentious and may turn out to be
essentially fact dependent and result driven. At a minimum, however,
the Court appears to be increasingly aware of administrative law’s
8
importance to federalism. Exploring the relationship between

6. See Young, supra note 4, at 133.
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. On the Court’s docket for the October 2007 Term were two cases addressing the
preemptive effect of federal administrative determinations. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S.
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federalism and administrative law seems particularly useful at this
early juncture, when the Court’s jurisprudence on the question is still
in a formative state.
My aim in this Article is twofold: first, to examine how the Court
may be employing administrative law as a vehicle for addressing
federalism concerns; and second, to assess how well administrative
law performs this role and how the Court should understand the
relationship between federalism and administrative law. I conclude
that administrative law has important federalism-reinforcing features,
but that the Court’s decisions to date have failed to fully develop
administrative law’s federalism potential. I also argue that the best
approach—not only for the functioning of federal agencies but,
critically, for the continued vibrancy of federalism in the world of the
modern national administrative state—is for the Court (and Congress
and the president) to advance federalism concerns within the overall
rubric of administrative law.
The Article consists of four parts. Part I contains an analysis of
recent Supreme Court precedent, focusing in particular on six
decisions addressing the intersection of federalism and administrative
law. Part II advances the claim that administrative law may be
becoming the locus of a new federalism. Here I contend that the
Court is unwilling to curb Congress on federalism grounds and is
instead addressing federalism concerns through an administrative law
framework. I then examine two ways in which this phenomenon is
occurring: application of ordinary administrative law to the benefit of
the states, and development of more extraordinary federalisminspired administrative law analyses. I also discuss the current
administrative preemption debate, which I contend approaches the
relationship between federalism and administrative law in overly
narrow terms.

Ct. 1168 (2008) (mem.), aff’g by an equally divided Court Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.,
467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a state product liability action against a federallyapproved drug was not preempted); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2008)
(holding state tort law action preempted by the FDA’s premarket scrutiny and approval of the
challenged medical device). In addition, in the October 2008 Term, the Court will hear another
preemption case, Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008),
which raises the question of whether the FDA’s approval of a drug label preempts a state tort
suit alleging that a drug manufacturer failed to provide adequate warning of a drug’s dangers.
See infra text accompanying notes 86–92.
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Part III turns to a more normative and theoretical perspective. I
begin by examining whether administrative law is likely to prove an
effective mechanism for addressing federalism concerns. In addition
to rejecting claims that administrative agencies are categorically illsuited to protecting state regulatory autonomy, I emphasize the need
to distinguish between administrative agencies and administrative
law. I argue that three features of administrative law hold strong
potential to protect state interests: administrative law’s procedural
and substantive requirements, in particular its provisions for noticeand-comment rulemaking and the demand for reasoned
decisionmaking; its doctrinal and institutional capaciousness; and its
very status as nonconstitutional and generally applicable law. I then
turn to analyzing whether using administrative law as a vehicle for
advancing federalism is a legitimate judicial undertaking or instead an
instance of courts unjustifiably intruding on congressional power. I
conclude that this use is legitimate and underscore the benefits of
such an administrative law approach over alternative federalism
doctrines.
Finally, in Part IV, I assess the implications of this analysis of
administrative law’s federalism potential. One implication is that the
Court should employ administrative law with an eye to reinforcing
agencies’ sensitivity and responsiveness to state interests. A second is
that federalism concerns raised by federal agency action may be best
advanced through ordinary administrative law, albeit with express
recognition of how state interests factor into judicial review.
Although the Court’s recent decisions take some helpful steps in this
direction, their lack of clarity and reflection on how federalism
concerns should factor into application of administrative law limit
their generative potential.
I. A FEDERALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SEXTET
Federalism and federal administrative law are an unfamiliar
couple, particularly in Supreme Court precedent. Although the Court
regularly decides cases involving one or the other of these topics, and
both are sometimes present in cases before it, for the most part the
two remain doctrinally and analytically separate. But in six recent,
highly charged decisions, issued over a four-year period, the
relationship of federalism and administrative law has repeatedly risen
to the fore. Most prominently this has taken the form of an injection
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of federalism into administrative law challenges of federal agency
action. Yet the reverse has also occurred, with administrative law
surfacing in more straightforward federalism challenges. Studying this
sextet of decisions offers insights into the Court’s growing awareness
of the intersection between federalism and administrative law.
A. Federalism’s Appearance in Administrative Law Challenges
Challenges to actions by federal agencies are a regular staple of
the Court’s docket. Of late, the Court’s administrative law
jurisprudence has focused overwhelmingly on determining when
9
agency statutory interpretations should receive Chevron deference.
The three federal agency challenges discussed in this Section—Alaska
10
Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA,
11
12
Gonzales v. Oregon, and Massachusetts v. EPA —share that focus;
each involves a challenge to agency interpretation of a governing
13
statute. What differentiates them—aside from being high profile,
9. E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2344 (2007); Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005); Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 215 (2002). “Chevron deference” refers to deference under the wellknown framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretations laid out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). For a description of the Chevron
framework, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191–92 (2006).
10. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
11. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
12. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
13. A fourth decision that might be included in this category is Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (plurality opinion). There, in rejecting the Army Corps of Engineers’
view of its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA) as too broad, id. at 2220, the plurality
opinion by Justice Scalia emphasized that “the Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of
Congress’s commerce power” and intruded on “‘the States’ traditional and primary power over
land and water use’ [by] . . . authoriz[ing] the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of
immense stretches of intrastate land,” id. at 2224 (citations omitted) (quoting Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001)). The plurality relied on these federalism concerns to justify its refusal to defer to the
Corps’ statutory interpretation under Chevron, emphasizing that it “would expect a clearer
statement from Congress to authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope
of constitutional validity.” Id. Justice Scalia also emphasized that Congress’s policy in the CWA
intended to have the states play the primary role in pollution reduction and regulating use of
land and water resources. Id. Yet the extent to which the plurality opinion in Rapanos actually
rests on federalism concerns is unclear. The opinion also contended that the Corps’
interpretation was contrary to the text of the CWA, id. at 2220, and Justice Scalia’s invocation
of federalism at the end of the opinion has an air of gilding the lily. In addition, Chief Justice
Roberts argued in his concurrence that had the EPA and the Corps gone forward with a
proposed rulemaking on the jurisdictional question, their views of the CWA’s “broad [and]
somewhat ambiguous” terms would have been entitled to deference—suggesting that federalism
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very contentious decisions—is the way that members of the Court
invoked federalism concerns in determining whether to uphold the
challenged agency action.
1. ADEC v. EPA. The first decision in this series, ADEC, was
issued in 2004 and involved the Environmental Protection Agency’s
14
(EPA) implementation of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Under that
Act, no source emitting more than 250 tons of nitrogen oxides a year
15
can be constructed or modified without obtaining a permit, and no
permit can be issued “unless the facility uses the ‘best available
16
control technology’ (BACT)” for each CAA pollutant it emits.
States can obtain permitting authority from the EPA. If states do so,
they have primary responsibility for implementing the CAA within
their territory, including the responsibility for issuing permits and
17
making BACT determinations.
The question in ADEC was whether the EPA had authority to
18
supervise a state’s BACT determinations. The EPA read the CAA
as granting it authority to block construction of a facility permitted by
a state when it determined that the state’s BACT determination was
19
unreasonable. In a 5–4 decision, the Court agreed, arguing that the
EPA’s interpretation, although “not qualify[ing] for the dispositive
20
force described in Chevron” because promulgated in internal
guidance memoranda that lacked the force of law, “nevertheless
21
warrant[s] respect.” The Court further upheld the EPA’s conclusion
was not determinative of his view of the case either. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In
any event, Justice Kennedy dismissed the plurality’s invocation of the avoidance canon on
federalism grounds, see id. at 2246, 2249–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and his vote concurring
in the judgment was determinative of the result in the case.
14. ADEC, 540 U.S. at 468.
15. Id. at 472 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1) (2000) (requiring a “major emitting facility” to
obtain a permit); 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (defining “major emitting facility” as one “with the potential
to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant”)).
16. Id. at 468 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (describing the states’ responsibility in implementing the CAA); id.
§ 7661a (establishing the procedure for delegating “permitting authority” to states); id.
§ 7479(3) (giving the “permitting authority” the ability to make “best available control
technology” (BACT) determinations).
18. ADEC, 540 U.S. at 469.
19. Id. at 485.
20. Id. at 487.
21. Id. at 488 (quoting Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)).
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that the state environmental agency had acted unreasonably in
finding the facility met the CAA’s BACT requirements and issuing a
22
permit.
From the majority’s perspective, ADEC was simply an ordinary
administrative challenge, one in which federalism figured hardly at all
and instead the expertise and enforcement needs of the federal
agency charged with implementation dominated. By contrast, Justice
Kennedy in dissent viewed the case fundamentally in federalism
terms. He argued vociferously that the Court’s decision remitted
23
“[t]he federal balance . . . to a single agency official”
and
“relegat[ed] States to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, instead of coequal sovereigns entitled to the same
24
dignity and respect.” The majority responded that the federal courts
were available to protect the states against EPA overreaching,
suggesting that it was not rejecting potential federalism concerns
wholesale but instead simply did not find such concerns implicated in
25
the specific agency action before it. For the most part, however, the
majority and dissent in ADEC talked past one another rather than
attempting to resolve the tension between their federalism and
administrative law rubrics.
As a result, ADEC offers little guidance about how the Court
believes federalism and administrative law principles should be
integrated. Yet it is an early signal of the Court’s awareness of the
potential connections between these two areas of doctrine.
2. Gonzales v. Oregon. In Oregon, the relationship between
federalism and administrative law, hinted at in ADEC, assumed

22. Id. at 496.
23. Id. at 517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 518.
25. Id. at 495 (majority opinion). The facts of the case offer support for the majority’s view.
The CAA assigned the EPA an oversight role regarding state permitting decisions and
implementation decisions, see id. at 468–69, and no one disputed that the EPA had authority to
prohibit a facility’s construction or modification in some circumstances, see id. at 484–85. The
EPA had long asserted the power over BACT determinations it claimed here, had raised its
concerns with the state agency beforehand, and had suggested ways the state agency could
justify its determination. See id. at 478–81. In addition, the state agency’s final BACT
determination does seem to be motivated by reluctance to impose costs on a major employer in
northwest Alaska rather than environmental concerns; notably, the state agency never
explained the inconsistency between its ultimate BACT determination and its initial assessment
that greater emissions control was economically feasible. Id. at 498–500.
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center stage. Decided in 2006, Oregon involved a challenge to
Attorney General John Ashcroft’s implementation of the Controlled
26
Substances Act (CSA). Under the CSA, physicians can lawfully
dispense controlled substances only if they are registered to do so
27
with the attorney general. In 2001, Ashcroft issued an interpretive
rule stating that prescribing controlled substances to assist suicide was
grounds for suspending or revoking a doctor’s CSA registration
28
because assisting suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose. As a
practical matter, this rule would have nullified Oregon’s Death with
Dignity Act, which legalized prescribing drugs to allow terminally ill
29
patients to commit suicide; doctors would be unwilling to issue such
prescriptions if by doing so they risked losing their right to prescribe
controlled substances altogether. Indeed, preventing assisted suicide
under the Oregon act was the primary motivation behind the rule’s
30
promulgation.
In Oregon, the Court held that Ashcroft’s interpretive rule
31
violated the CSA and was thus invalid. The majority decision,
written by Justice Kennedy, portrayed its resolution of Oregon’s
challenge as an ordinary assessment of whether an executive official
had exceeded statutory authority—“an inquiry familiar to the courts”
32
that was guided by “familiar principles” of administrative law. In
particular, the majority relied on the Court’s 2001 decision in United
33
States v. Mead Corp., which had limited Chevron deference to
instances when Congress had delegated authority to issue rules with
34
the force of law to the agency. The Oregon majority held that
26. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(2) (2000).
28. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 911.
29. Id. at 911, 914 (describing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2003)).
30. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 913.
31. Id. at 925.
32. Id. at 911, 914.
33. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
34. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 915 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27). The Oregon majority also
cited precedent that precludes application of Chevron deference in contexts in which more than
one agency is given sole interpretive authority under a statute, see id. at 922, and noted that the
CSA grants the secretary of Health and Human Services a central role when medical judgments
are involved, id. at 921; see also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 215–16, 242–44 (emphasizing the importance of
Congress’s decision to delegate to multiple agents in the CSA). Interestingly, the Court did not
rely on the suggestion in Mead that Chevron deference generally should apply only to agency
statutory interpretations promulgated through agency procedures such as notice-and-comment
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Congress had not delegated authority to determine what constitutes
legitimate medical practice to the attorney general, and thus that the
35
interpretive rule did not merit Chevron deference. More generally,
the majority’s opinion was animated by concerns of executive branch
overreaching and self-aggrandizement. The danger it invoked was of
a single executive official, lacking professional expertise and
motivated by politics, imposing on the nation that official’s personal
36
views of what constituted legitimate medical practice. Oregon thus
stands as a prime example of administrative law’s longstanding
concerns with politics trumping law and unchecked executive
37
authority.
Yet the decision also plainly turns on federalism concerns. It was
not simply concentrated power in the attorney general that troubled
the majority, but more specifically that “a single Executive officer
[would have] the power to effect a radical shift of authority from the
States to the Federal Government to define general standards of
38
medical practice in every locality.” Such a result was at odds with
usual practice, under which “regulation of health and safety is
39
‘primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern.’” Reading the
CSA against this federalism backdrop, the majority rejected the idea
that through the statute Congress had intended to assert “expansive

rulemaking, Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, perhaps because that aspect of Mead has proven more
contentious for some members of the Court, see, e.g., Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221
(2002).
35. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 916; see also id. at 922 (holding that the attorney general’s
interpretation also was not due Skidmore deference).
36. Id. at 924 (“The primary problem with the Government’s argument . . . is its
assumption that the CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because
it may be inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice.”); see also id. at
913–14, 922 (emphasizing the attorney general’s lack of any medical expertise and failure to
consult before issuing the interpretive rule—either with Oregon or others in the executive
branch—as well as noting Ashcroft’s prior efforts to prevent Oregon’s experiment with assisted
suicide when he was a member of the Senate).
37. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 95. Professor Lisa Bressman has offered a slightly different
take on Oregon, arguing that it was the profoundly undemocratic aspect of the interpretive rule
that made the Court reluctant to defer. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 765, 776–80 (2007).
38. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 925. The similarity between this language and that of the ADEC
dissent is more than just coincidence, as Justice Kennedy was the author of both.
39. Id. at 923 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
719 (1985)).
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40

federal authority to regulate medicine.” Instead, it portrayed the
CSA as having a far more limited aim, preventing drug abuse and
drug trafficking, and as relying on state regulation of medical
41
practice.
Oregon therefore represents an instance in which the Court
42
directly linked federalism to federal administrative law. On the
surface the majority’s integration of these two appears smooth;
according to the majority, the federalism implications of the
interpretive rule provided reason to doubt the attorney general’s
claim of delegated authority and to refuse to defer to his view of the
43
CSA. But tensions exist underneath this superficial doctrinal
consistency. A difficult question left open by the majority opinion is
whether the result would have been different had the attorney
general’s rejection of assisted suicide emerged from a more
consultative, formal process in which views of the secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) were solicited and
given determinative weight. Put differently, was the real problem
here a violation of federalism norms or deviation from appropriate
44
administrative process? Answering this question was not necessary
to resolve the case, but leaving it open obscures the import of Oregon
regarding how federalism and administrative law intersect. In
addition, the contrast between Oregon and ADEC is noteworthy; in
Oregon, the Court invoked federalism as a reason not to defer to a

40. Id. at 924.
41. Id. at 922–23. For a similar invocation of federalism to justify a narrower reading of a
federal statute than that offered by the federal agency charged with its implementation, see
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223–24 (2006) (plurality opinion).
42. This linkage was already present in the case, as the Ninth Circuit had heavily stressed
federalism in invalidating the interpretive rule. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th
Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
43. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 923–24.
44. The decision’s narrow view of the CSA appears to preclude the latter possibility, as
does its emphasis on Congress’s role in maintaining the federal-state balance and the statute’s
express restriction on preemption. Id. at 922–25. But that conclusion is somewhat at odds with
the opinion’s repeated emphasis on “the Secretary’s primacy in shaping medical policy under
the CSA,” and its assertion that “no question” exists that the federal government has
constitutional authority to regulate medical practice. Id. at 925; see also Gersen, supra note 34,
at 242–45 (noting emphasis on role of both HHS and the states in the opinion). Moreover, given
the majority’s recognition that “legitimate medical purpose” is ambiguous, it is unclear why such
a joint, administratively proper determination by the federal officials delegated authority in this
area by Congress should not be given deference. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 916 (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000)).
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federal agency’s assertion of authority, whereas in ADEC the Court
did defer notwithstanding the troubling federalism implications of
doing so. Although largely fueled by factual differences between the
45
two cases, this unexplained discrepancy in results reinforces the
sense that the Court lacks a consistent understanding of the
relationship between federalism and administrative law.
3. Massachusetts v. EPA. Federalism and administrative law
were again expressly linked one year later in Massachusetts. There, in
a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to
regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as air
46
pollutants, and that the reasons the EPA gave to justify this refusal
47
violated the CAA. As presented to the Court, Massachusetts
appeared to be a straightforward administrative law challenge—
indeed, federalism was almost entirely absent from the case as it was
48
briefed to the Court and in the decision below. The majority opinion
in Massachusetts imbued the case with federalism implications,
however, by emphasizing Massachusetts’s status as a sovereign state
in holding that Massachusetts had standing to sue. According to the
majority, “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking
49
review here is a sovereign State”:
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign
prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an
emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the

45. The EPA’s actions in ADEC lacked many of the indicia of abuse and federal agency
overreaching that characterized the attorney general’s interpretive rule in Oregon. See supra
note 25.
46. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 (2007).
47. Id. at 1463.
48. Federalism concerns surfaced in only one amicus brief submitted by Arizona and other
states on behalf of Massachusetts. See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 22–24, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380;
Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1, 5 & n.18, 30–31 (2007) (noting that the issue of “special standing” for states was absent
from the briefs except for the amicus brief filed by Arizona). Nor was the case an obvious
vehicle for raising federalism concerns, given that it arose from a rulemaking petition filed with
the EPA by private environmental groups; Massachusetts and other governments intervened in
the case only after the rulemaking petition was denied. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct at 1449–51.
49. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
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exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle
emissions might well be pre-empted.
These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal
Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect
Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing [air pollutant]
standards . . . . Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition
as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right and
Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing
50
analysis.

Despite taking the initiative to invoke federalism concerns, the
majority was quite imprecise with respect to how Massachusetts’s
51
sovereignty interests were implicated. Massachusetts was not
claiming that its own regulatory efforts were unduly preempted by the
EPA or that the federal government was exceeding its constitutional
powers—on the contrary, Massachusetts’s central allegation was that
52
the federal government was not asserting its authority enough. The
majority never explained why, having ceded regulatory authority to
the federal government over an area of activity, a state would
continue to have a sovereignty interest in forcing the federal
government to exercise that authority in a particular manner.

50. Id. at 1454–55 (citations omitted).
51. The majority sought to draw an analogy to parens patriae precedent involving interstate
pollution, in which the Court had emphasized the “quasi-sovereign” state interest “in all the
earth and air within its domain” and in having “the last word as to whether its mountains shall
be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” Id. at 1454 (quoting
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). Insofar as the majority was using these
cases to establish that Massachusetts had a cognizable interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign
territory” which was being lost due to rising water levels, the invocation of Massachusetts’s state
status seems unnecessary, given that Massachusetts actually owned a “great deal” of coastal
property in the state. Id. at 1454. If, on the other hand, the majority sought to draw a connection
to Massachusetts’s regulatory interest in controlling pollutant emissions within its borders,
then—as Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent—the federal-state context of the dispute
before the Court rendered this interstate precedent inapplicable. See id. at 1465–66 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). States did not cede regulatory authority over their territory to each other by
joining the union, but they did grant such power to the federal government. Not surprisingly,
therefore, existing precedent is far less sympathetic to a state’s assertion of quasi-sovereign
interests on behalf of its citizens against the federal government. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp &
Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
52. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1449, 1451 (majority opinion).
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One possible explanation focuses on preemption. Section 209(a)
of the CAA prohibits any state or political subdivision from adopting
or enforcing “any standard relating to the control of emissions from
53
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” This prohibition
arguably gives states distinct sovereign interests in ensuring that the
EPA fulfills its statutory duties. On this view, given that Congress has
disabled them from asserting regulatory authority in their own right,
the states have a sovereign interest in ensuring that the federal
government performs its regulatory responsibilities so that regulatory
54
gaps are avoided. Such an argument for state standing is open to a
variety of objections—among others, that allowing states access to
federal court based solely on sovereignty interests fails to accord with

53. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). Section 209(b) provides that the EPA must grant a waiver
for emissions controls promulgated by any state that had standards for emissions from new
automobiles prior to March 30, 1966—which means California, as it was the only state to have
such standards—provided the state determines that its “standards will be, in the aggregate, at
least as protective of public health and welfare” as the federal standards and the EPA does not
find that this state determination is arbitrary and capricious, that the state does not need the
standards to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” or that the state’s standards are
inconsistent with Section 202(a). Id. § 7543(b)(1); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Kathryn A. Watts & Amy
J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global
Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1029, 1037 (2008) (discussing the special role
California plays in setting new automobile emission standards). In addition, the 1977 Clean Air
Act Amendments provided that other states could adopt standards identical to California
standards that have received a waiver. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9595, sec. 129(b), § 177, 91 Stat. 685, 750 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(B));
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 525. California issued such emission standards for
greenhouse gases, which were then adopted by eleven other states. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1499, 1526–27 (2000). California sought a waiver for these standards, which the EPA
denied in December 2007, two years after the request was filed. See Letter from Stephen
Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007),
available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. For analysis of California’s waiver
request, see Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism,
19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 15–29), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096571; Nina A. Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver
Decision and Agency Interpretation: A Response to Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2157, 2161 (2008).
54. See Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary
Citizens?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1774 (2008); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 53, at
1034. In addition, the CAA embodies a cooperative regulatory framework under which states
bear responsibility in the first instance for devising plans to ensure that air pollutant emissions
within their borders meet federal air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. The special role the
states play in implementing the CAA could also be thought to give them added ability to
challenge determinations the EPA makes under the Act.
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the Constitution’s limitation of the federal judicial power to “cases”
and “controversies” and thus to legal as opposed to political disputes.
But it at least offers an explanation of why state sovereignty interests
might be seen as implicated by the administrative challenge before
the Court.
This alternative account is not, however, one offered by the
55
Massachusetts majority. Instead, although it indicates that the Court
perceived a connection between federalism and this challenge to
federal agency action, the opinion—like the opinions in ADEC and
Oregon—leaves the nature of this connection quite opaque. Perhaps
the majority’s emphasis on state status is a signal of the Court
developing a deeper understanding of the role that states can play in
overseeing federal program administration. Or perhaps this emphasis
was simply a way of garnering Justice Kennedy’s vote and is a rule
good for one case only, with the ultimate significance of
Massachusetts being simply its forgiving application of the standard
56
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife standing analysis to force the
57
government to address global warming. A third, equally plausible
view is that Massachusetts will serve to undermine private groups’
access to the courts to challenge regulatory inaction, with the looser
application of Lujan’s demands of injury, causation, and
redressability being limited to instances in which states are plaintiffs.
B. Administrative Law’s Appearance in Federalism Challenges
Just as federalism has surfaced in administrative law challenges,
so too has administrative law appeared in the Court’s federalism
decisions, albeit to date playing a more tangential role. Here three

55. Although the majority insisted that Massachusetts was simply asserting “its rights under
[the CAA],” Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17, the rights it was referring to were simply
Massachusetts’s rights to petition the EPA to engage in a rulemaking regarding new motor
vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases and to challenge the EPA’s violation of statutory
requirements. The problem is that these rights were in no way unique to Massachusetts as a
state. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (providing that a petition seeking review of the administrator’s
action in promulgating a standard under § 7521 or any final action taken by the administrator
must be filed in the D.C. Circuit, but not limiting who can file such a petition); see also id. § 7604
(authorizing “any person” to bring a suit against the administrator to challenge the
administrator’s failure to undertake a nondiscretionary duty).
56. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
57. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 67.
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decisions are particularly noteworthy: Gonzales v. Raich, Watters v.
59
60
Wachovia Bank, and Riegel v. Medtronic.
1. Gonzales v. Raich. Decided a year before Oregon, Raich
also involved the CSA, but it focused on whether the CSA fell within
Congress’s commerce power. In 1996 California passed a medical
marijuana initiative, legalizing personal medical use and possession of
61
marijuana. The California law conflicted with the CSA, which lists
62
marijuana as a Schedule I drug and therefore prohibits all use of it.
Two women who used marijuana under the terms of the California
measure brought suit, arguing that the CSA’s ban exceeded
Congress’s commerce power as applied to the cultivation, possession,
63
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes. By a 6–3 vote,
64
the Court rejected this claim. The Raich majority was unsympathetic
to the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, emphasizing that Congress has
“power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
65
commerce.” Describing the activities regulated by the CSA as
66
“quintessentially economic,” the majority held that “Congress had a
58. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
59. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
60. Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). In addition, in a few cases involving
challenges to state actions in the context of cooperative federal-state programs, the Court
emphasized the importance of the views of the federal agency involved. See, e.g., S.D. Warren
Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2006); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v.
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 666–68 (2003); Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship
Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003). Interestingly, however—and consistent with
developments in administrative law generally—the Court generally gave little weight to federal
views when those views were simply presented in amicus briefs in court, as opposed to officially
adopted by the agency in the course of its implementation of the relevant statute. See, e.g., Ark.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Alhborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 1764–65 (2006); Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (making no reference to the United States’ views in favor
of preemption presented only in amicus briefs, notwithstanding that the Court agreed that
California’s fleet rules were preempted).
61. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West
2007).
62. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199, 2204.
63. Id. at 2199–200.
64. Id. at 2209. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the five-Justice
majority that application of the CSA here was constitutional. Id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
65. Id. at 2205 (majority opinion).
66. Id. at 2211.
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rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole
in the CSA” and undermine that statute’s comprehensive regulatory
67
scheme. By contrast, the dissent insisted that the relevant activity
was the cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for personal
medical purposes, which it deemed noneconomic and outside the
68
scope of the commerce power.
Raich is overwhelmingly a federalism decision, centered squarely
on the scope of Congress’s constitutional powers. But administrative
law also surfaces here, with the Court repeatedly noting that under
the CSA the attorney general has authority to change a drug’s
69
schedule classification. Moreover, despite protesting that the
specifics of how marijuana is regulated had “no relevance” to the
question of congressional power, the majority went so far as to
suggest that administrative denial of a petition to reschedule
marijuana might well be overturned on appeal: “We acknowledge
that evidence proffered by respondents in this case regarding the
effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial,
would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require
70
marijuana to be listed in Schedule I.”
Although administrative law played only a marginal role in the
majority opinion and was largely relegated to the footnotes, the
interesting question is why it appeared at all. The most plausible
explanation is that it offered some solace against the specter of
unlimited federal power. The majority wanted to underscore that
finding an activity to fall within the scope of Congress’s constitutional
authority did not mean that the resulting federal regulation was free
71
of all legal constraints against federal overreaching.
The
rescheduling option may have been “irrelevant” to the constitutional
question of the scope of congressional authority, but it was quite
relevant on an operational federalism level as a means states could
exploit to preserve the ability to experiment with medical care and
67. Id. at 2209.
68. Id. at 2224–29 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2204 & n.23, 2211 n.25 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 2211 n.37.
71. Nor did such a finding mean that the regulation was free from political constraints. See
id. at 2215 (“[P]erhaps even more important than these legal avenues is the democratic process,
in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the halls of
Congress.”).
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obtain judicial scrutiny of federal determinations. Like ADEC,
however, the Raich majority failed to spell out the relationship it saw
between federalism and administrative law, thereby limiting the
decision’s impact on future cases.
2. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. The Watters decision was
handed down just two weeks after Massachusetts. Watters involved
the interplay between federal and state banking authorities, and in
particular the extent of supervision the latter could assert over statechartered subsidiaries of national banks. Under the National Bank
Act (NBA), national or federally chartered banks are subject to
oversight by the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), with states generally being denied any supervisory or
72
oversight authority. Ordinarily, state-chartered banking institutions
are subject to state oversight, which in the case of Michigan’s law
meant that institutions had to obtain a state license, file reports with
73
the state, and submit to state audits. In 2001, the OCC promulgated
a regulation providing that “State laws apply to national bank
operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the
74
parent national bank.” Given that state supervisory laws do not
apply to national banks under the NBA absent an express statutory
provision to the contrary, the import of the regulation was to preempt
state supervision in regard to all national bank operating
75
subsidiaries.
Watters appeared to be the occasion on which the Court would
resolve a recurrent question in preemption challenges that directly
engages the relationship between federalism and administrative law:
to what extent should courts defer to administrative agencies’

72. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 93a, 371(a) (2000) (granting the OCC authority to issue rules and
regulations regarding the powers of national banking associations); NationsBank of N.C., N.A.
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995) (“As the administrator charged
with supervision of the National Bank Act . . . the Comptroller bears primary responsibility for
surveillance of ‘the business of banking’ authorized by § 24 . . . .” (citation omitted)). The NBA
refers to such supervisory authority as “visitorial powers” and provides that “[n]o national bank
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a); see also Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 114–17 (2d Cir. 2007)
(discussing the meaning of “visitorial powers”).
73. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1565–66 (2007).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2008).
75. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 5.34(e), 24a(g)(3)(A). The OCC also argued in favor of
broad preemption of substantive state law as applied to national banks. See infra note 84.
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interpretations of the preemptive scope of the statutes they
76
administer? On the one hand, federalism concerns with intruding on
a traditional area of state regulation, augmented by the presumption
against preemption, counseled against granting deference to the
77
OCC’s regulation. On the other, from a purely administrative law
perspective, the OCC’s views deserved deference: the NBA did not
expressly address the question of state supervision of national bank
subsidiaries, the OCC was the federal agency charged with
implementing the NBA, and the OCC had promulgated its regulation
using notice-and-comment rulemaking. Ordinarily, these features
78
would suffice to trigger Chevron deference.
The Supreme Court, however, held in a 5–3 decision that the
NBA itself preempted state supervision over national bank
subsidiaries, concluding therefore that the degree of deference due
the OCC’s regulation was “an academic question” it need not
79
address. But that the majority foreswore the need to discuss
Chevron deference does not mean that the decision bypassed
administrative law. On the contrary, its analysis fell well within the
administrative law ambit: like Massachusetts, in administrative law
terms the Watters decision represents a Chevron step one
determination to the effect that the NBA unambiguously preempted
80
the state supervisory and licensing requirements at issue.
Watters represents an expansive approach to preemption. The
majority treated the possibility of both state and federal oversight of

76. For earlier decisions presenting but not resolving this question, see cases cited infra
note 177.
77. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (describing the presumption
against preemption set out in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
78. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350–51 (2007);
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). All of the appellate courts that
considered challenges to state efforts to exercise oversight over national bank subsidiaries had
invoked Chevron in upholding the OCC’s regulation. See Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh,
463 F.3d 325, 331–33 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560–63 (6th
Cir. 2005), aff’d 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 958–67
(9th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2005).
79. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572–73 & n.13 (2007). Justice
Thomas did not participate. Id. at 1573. Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s view of the
NBA and also argued that Chevron deference was inappropriate. See id. at 1578–79, 1581–85
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”).
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state-chartered subsidiaries as an unjustified regulatory burden rather
than as a common feature of a federal system—and one national
banks could have avoided by not utilizing state-chartered
81
subsidiaries. Indeed, the majority denied that a subsidiary’s statechartered status gave states any more legitimate interest in overseeing
the subsidiary’s actions than the states would have in overseeing the
subsidiary’s parent national bank. To a large extent, the majority’s
unsympathetic stance to the states stemmed from the fact that the
case involved the NBA, a statute the Court has consistently read as
creating a presumption against state regulation of national banks and
82
in favor of exclusive federal control. Yet application of the NBA
presumption here was certainly contestable, given the importance of
state- versus federal-chartered status to the nation’s dual banking
system, as well as the lack of clear authorization in the NBA for
either national banks’ use of state-chartered operating subsidiaries or
83
the displacement of state supervision of such subsidiaries.
Perhaps more importantly, the majority never addressed the
states’ concern that, absent some independent oversight role, they
would lack the ability to enforce state laws to which the subsidiaries
at issue were subject. Although such state laws were enforceable by
the OCC, Michigan and its amici expressed concern that the OCC

81. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1568, 1572–73.
82. See, e.g., id. at 1567 (“We have ‘interpreted grants of . . . powers to national banks as
grants of authority . . . ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.’” (quoting Barnett Bank of
Marion City, N.A., v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))); id. at
1571 (“Security against significant interference by state regulators is a characteristic condition of
the business of banking conducted by national banks . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Their different understandings of the NBA and banking in general may explain the interesting
lineup of Justices in the case: Justice Ginsburg, often solicitous of state regulatory authority,
wrote the majority opinion, in which she was joined by Justice Kennedy, id. at 1564, a frequent
advocate of state interests. On the other hand, Justice Scalia, usually insistent on full-scale
application of Chevron—including in Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 926 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for application of Chevron to agency action that preempted a state
regulation)—joined Justice Stevens’ dissent that seemed to suggest Chevron was never
applicable to preemptive agency action absent express statutory authorization, Watters, 127 S.
Ct. at 1573 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption
of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 35),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028886 (arguing that Watters reversed the presumptions
that previously governed preemption determinations in the banking context); infra text
accompanying notes 154–58 (discussing ambiguity in the NBA); see also Kenneth E. Scott, The
Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (1977)
(describing the dual banking system and noting the importance played by the chartering entity).
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was aggressively seeking to free national banks from state control and
would prove unwilling to enforce state consumer protection laws in
84
the place of state agencies. Yet the Watters majority opinion
nowhere discusses the relationship between federal and state
regulatory agencies, directing its attention instead solely to the
relationship between federal and state legislation.
Thus, despite being decided in close succession, Watters and
Massachusetts are polar opposites in their approach to state interests.
In Massachusetts, the Court injected federalism into what had
previously been thought a purely administrative law case and
underscored the legitimacy of undefined state sovereignty interests.
By contrast, in Watters it declared federalism essentially irrelevant
and gave little weight to a concern seemingly central to state
85
sovereignty: ensuring adequate enforcement of state laws. The
striking contrast between Massachusetts and Watters suggests
confusion on the Court with respect to how to structure the
86
relationship between federalism and administrative law.
84. See Brief of Petitioner at 31–39, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL
2570336; Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570992; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, The
OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 275–76,
292, 296–97 (2004) (arguing that the OCC is too self-interested on the question of preemption
because of its reliance on fees from banks with national charters and describing the OCC’s
advocacy of freedom from state laws as an advantage of a national charter). Conflicts between
the OCC and the states were not limited to the state-chartered subsidiary context, but instead
had also arisen in regard to enforcement of state consumer protection laws generally. See
Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing OCC
preemption of state enforcement of antidiscrimination laws relating to real estate lending
practices); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory
Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2284–86 (2004) (discussing OCC preemption of state
predatory lending laws). Adding substance to the states’ fears are the OCC’s own statements
indicating that it believes most substantive state laws are preempted as applied to national
banks. See OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,895, 1,912–13 (Jan. 13, 2004);
Wilmarth, supra, at 233.
85. The contrast is even starker if Massachusetts’s special rules for state standing are
viewed as tied to preemption of state authority. On that view, Massachusetts’s logic would
suggest that states should have standing to sue the OCC to enforce state laws if the OCC refuses
to do so and the states are preempted from doing so themselves. But the Court never linked the
two decisions or suggested that Massachusetts’s standing analysis offered a remedy for any
enforcement gap Watters might create.
86. The Court may be forced to confront the administrative preemption issue head on in
Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008), a case on its
calendar for the October 2008 Term addressing the extent to which approval of a prescription
drug label by the FDA preempts state tort law actions based on that labeling. The FDA has
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3. Riegel v. Medtronic. The most recent member of the sextet,
Riegel, was decided in the spring of 2008. Riegel arose out of a state
tort suit involving a medical device that had received premarket
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the
premarket approval process created by the Medical Device
87
Amendments of 1976 (MDA). Characterizing this process as
88
“rigorous” and emphasizing the extent of the FDA’s scrutiny, the
Court held that the MDA expressly preempted application of
common-law tort duties to a device that had received such approval
89
and was in compliance with FDA requirements.
90
Although much less contentious, Riegel is in many ways a
Watters redux, with the Court again eschewing the need to determine
what level of deference to accord an administrative preemption
determination by finding preemption clearly mandated by text of the
91
relevant statute. Interestingly, the Court also referenced in passing
92
standard administrative deference doctrines, suggesting that the
Court did not view the preemption and federalism-laden posture of

taken the position, in a preamble to a recent rule on drug labeling, that its labeling
determinations are preemptive. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,967 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). In the decision in Wyeth below, the Vermont Supreme Court did
not defer to the FDA’s view, concluding that the state law failure-to-warn claim at issue was
clearly not preempted by the relevant federal statute and thus the FDA’s position failed
Chevron step one. Levine, 944 A.2d at 192–93.
87. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005–06 (2008).
88. Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 1007–09, 1011. On the same day as it decided Riegel, the Court also upheld
preemption claims in two other cases, neither involving actions by federal agencies. See Rowe v.
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987
(2008). The Court additionally affirmed, by an equally divided court, a Second Circuit decision
holding that a state tort suit against an FDA-approved drug was not preempted. WarnerLambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (mem.), aff’g by an equally divided Court Desiano
v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006). The suit had been brought under a
Michigan statute that granted drug manufacturers immunity against product liability suits for
drugs receiving FDA approval and marketed in compliance with FDA requirements, unless the
manufacturer intentionally withheld or misrepresented information that would have affected
the FDA’s approval. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 2946(5) (2003). The Second Circuit had held that
suit under this exception was distinguishable from “fraud on the FDA” claims that the Supreme
Court had previously ruled preempted in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S.
341, 348 (2001). Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 94–96 (2d Cir. 2006).
90. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 1009 (majority opinion).
92. Id. at 1009–10.
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the case to displace otherwise applicable administrative law. But it is
hard to read much into these passing invocations, as the decision
plainly turned on the Justices’ independent assessment of the MDA’s
import and not on the position of the FDA. Indeed, Riegel reinforces
the impression that the Court is not approaching these cases with an
eye to the relationship of federalism and administrative law writ
large, but instead is focused on the details of the specific statutory and
regulatory schemes at issue.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A FEDERALISM VEHICLE
Six decisions are too few in number to do more than hint at
possible trends in the Court’s understanding of how federalism and
administrative law intersect. This is particularly true of decisions such
as Massachusetts and Oregon, given their highly politicized content
and the evident perception by the majority in each of egregious
agency overreaching. Watters and ADEC, by contrast, demonstrate
the Justices’ willingness to uphold what they view as more reasonable
agency positions, whereas Raich’s invocations of administrative
rescheduling are largely window dressing on a strong affirmation of
national power. From one perspective then, these are highly factbound decisions with limited general import. Moreover, a striking
feature of all six decisions is the largely undeveloped nature of the
Court’s analysis. In none did the Court offer an account of the
relationship between federalism and administrative law that went
beyond the case at hand. Indeed, as the comparisons above suggest,
the decisions at times appear almost inconsistent in approach,
particularly in the degree to which the Court gave weight to state
sovereignty concerns. Hence, it seems fair to say that the Court has
yet to arrive at a coherent understanding of what the relationship
between federalism and administrative law should be.
Nonetheless, these decisions share some common if inchoate
themes. One is their unwillingness to curb congressional regulatory
authority, whether by means of straightforward constitutional
federalism restrictions or subconstitutional federalism doctrines
requiring clear authorization for federal agency action that
substantially impacts the states. Another is their recurrent reliance on
administrative law as a vehicle for addressing federalism concerns.
Whether the Court is intentionally using administrative law in this
way is unclear. But at least as a practical matter, in these decisions
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administrative law operates to mitigate the impact of federal agency
decisions on the states and to protect the states against federal agency
overreaching. This use of administrative law as a vehicle for
addressing federalism concerns is obscured in the current debate over
administrative preemption, which tends to underscore the tensions
between federalism and administrative law rather than their potential
symbiosis.
A. Administrative Law as the New Federalism
1. The Absence of Constitutional Federalism Curbs on Congress.
An important initial point to note is the Court’s unwillingness to curb
congressional regulatory authority on constitutional federalism
grounds. This unwillingness is most apparent in Raich, with its
deference to Congress on the question of what constitutes the
relevant class of activities against which a Commerce Clause
challenge is assessed, its broad definition of economic activity, and its
93
lack of concern with protecting state regulatory experiments. Little
94
will fall outside of Congress’ regulatory purview under Raich. No
doubt, some measures may go too far in regulating intrastate
95
96
activity, and constraints such as the anticommandeering rule and

93. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005); see also Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing
Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 33–37 (critiquing Raich’s failure to take state experimentation seriously).
94. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222–23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Raich’s
deference to congressional class of activity determinations transformed the decisions in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which
had upheld commerce power challenges, into “nothing more than a drafting guide” that warned
Congress about the consequences of regulating too narrowly). Others have expressed similar
views of Raich. See Jonathan Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 762–66 (2005); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich:
Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 513–19
(2006); see also Young, supra note 93, at 38–40 (arguing that “[o]ne can identify plausible
federal statutes . . . that would be exceptionally hard to justify on any of the theories offered in
Raich,” but adding that “Raich most likely marks the outer bound of the Court’s ambition in
Commerce Clause cases” and that “[a] rollback of the national regulatory state was never in the
cards”).
95. Cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (finding that federal
jurisdiction over “ephemeral flows of water” under the CWA “stretches the outer limits of
Congress’s commerce power” and would require a clearer statement from Congress); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172–73 (2001) (limiting federal jurisdiction under the CWA to navigable waters to avoid
Commerce Clause issues).
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97

protections for state sovereign immunity will continue to apply to
congressional exercises of the commerce power. Nonetheless, Raich
establishes that the expansive view of the commerce power, in place
98
since the New Deal, will largely continue to govern. The other five
decisions echo this same theme; in none did the Court suggest that
Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority by enacting the
regulatory scheme in question. Indeed, even the Watters and ADEC
dissents agreed that Congress had power to authorize federal
agencies to preempt state action or review state administrative
99
determinations.
This lack of constitutional curbs on congressional regulatory
authority is hardly unique to these six decisions. The Court has
signaled similar reluctance to limit other forms of congressional
power, in particular the spending power and the Necessary and
100
Proper Clause, that underlie many federal regulatory programs.
Equally important, in its 2001 decision in Whitman v. American
101
Trucking Associations the Court refused to curtail Congress’s ability
to delegate power broadly to administrative agencies, stating it has
96. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
97. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
64–66, 72–73 (1996).
98. Nor will the Court’s recent changes in membership likely effect this conclusion, given
that Justices Kennedy and Scalia both voted to uphold congressional power in Raich. Raich, 125
S. Ct. 2198, 2209 (majority opinion); id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
99. The Watters dissent is clearest on this, rejecting out of hand Michigan’s suggestion that
granting federal agencies the power of preemption violated the Tenth Amendment. See Watters
v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1585 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
was more oblique in ADEC, in particular noting constitutional limits on the commerce power
such as the anticommandeering rule, but ultimately he too appears to accept that Congress’s
“vast legislative authority” would allow it to authorize federal agency review of state agency and
state court determinations. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,
512–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As discussed above, three Justices in Raich did assert
that application of the CSA to personal medical use and cultivation of marijuana was outside
Congress’s power. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
100. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (upholding a federal bribery statute
that covers any employee of an entity that receives more than $10,000 in federal funds, including
a state or local government, under the spending power and Necessary and Proper Clause); see
also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the federal government’s ability to broadly impose conditions on federal grants). The Court has
been much more willing to impose limits on Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the commerce power is far more important to the modern federal
administrative state.
101. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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“‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those
102
To be sure, the scope of
executing or applying the law.’”
congressional delegations is still subject to scrutiny, as Oregon
demonstrates, but critically such scrutiny focuses on issues of
statutory interpretation rather than constitutional limits on Congress.
Congress’s constitutional ability to delegate broadly is accepted, and
judicial inquiry centers instead on determining whether Congress in
103
fact did so.
2. The Absence of Subconstitutional Federalism Doctrines.
Interestingly, in the six decisions the Court also eschewed overt
reliance on subconstitutional federalism doctrines, such as the
104
presumption against preemption or clear statement requirements.
Often dubbed “process federalism,” these doctrines represent a
subconstitutional form of federalism in that they seek to protect states
from federal incursions not by means of direct constitutional limits on
congressional authority, but rather through federalism-inspired
105
canons of statutory construction.
The extent to which these
doctrines, in particular the presumption against preemption, actually

102. Id. at 474–75 (2001) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
103. Constitutional concerns may, however, inform the Court’s approach in determining
how a delegation of authority is read. In particular, Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the
Court’s unwillingness to enforce constitutional restrictions on delegation has not meant the
death of nondelegation doctrine, but rather its relocation to the field of statutory interpretation,
wherein concerns about the scope of authority wielded by administrative agencies are addressed
through a series of “nondelegation canons” of construction. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000).
104. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (clear statement requirement
before Congress will be read as regulating the states); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (clear statement requirement for abrogating state sovereign immunity);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (conditions on state receipt of
federal funds must be clearly stated); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(presumption against preemption).
105. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636–37 (1992); see also
Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1357–61, 1386–90
(2001) (describing process federalism and emphasizing its status as a form of constitutional
review). For further discussion of process federalism, see infra notes 257–59 and accompanying
text.

02__METZGER.DOC

2008]

9/30/2008 2:05:45 PM

THE NEW FEDERALISM

2051
106

drive judicial decisionmaking is a matter of some debate. In its
recent preemption jurisprudence the Court has often taken a
107
“freewheeling” approach to preemption, not even requiring a clear
and direct conflict between federal and state law but instead
upholding preemption claims based on the determination that state
law would be an obstacle to achieving the underlying purposes of
108
federal regulation. On the other hand, the Court invokes some of its
other federalism canons more consistently, such as the requirements
that conditions on federal funds and abrogation of state sovereign
109
immunity must be clearly stated.
None of these subconstitutional federalism doctrines surfaced in
the federalism–administrative law sextet, despite the fact that
Congress’s constitutional power to regulate was for the most part
unquestioned, precisely the context in which such doctrines are
designed to operate. In Watters, for example, the majority found
preemption based on a pragmatic assessment of the impact of state
involvement on the federal regulatory scheme. The majority never
referred to the presumption against preemption, notwithstanding the
dissent’s insistence that the presumption should have been
110
determinative. The absence of the federalism canons in Oregon is
especially noteworthy, given that the canons had provided one of the

106. See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 118–20, 122, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
107. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369.
108. See id. at 362–68; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1372 (2006); Young, supra note 4, at 30–32, 130–34. For
a discussion of different forms of preemption, see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2100–12 (2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225,
226–31 (2000). As many have noted, the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, particularly relating
to preemption of state tort law, is marked by inconsistencies. See, e.g., Dinh, supra, at 2085; Jack
Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178; Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17–36 (2007); Nelson, supra, at 233. Although generally expansive in its
preemption inquiry in recent years, the Court has also occasionally read the preemptive effect
of federal statutes more narrowly. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788,
1801–02 (2005); Young, supra note 4, at 40–41.
109. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459
(2006); Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
110. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1579, 1585–86 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, in his ADEC dissent, Justice Kennedy argued to no avail that “the Court
should at least insist upon a clear instruction from Congress” before finding that the EPA had
power to oversee state BACT determinations. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 513 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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bases on which the Ninth Circuit below had invalidated the attorney
111
general’s interpretive rule. By contrast, the Supreme Court viewed
the challenge solely through an administrative law lens, holding that it
was “unnecessary even to consider” application of such federalisminspired canons to conclude that the CSA did not delegate to the
112
attorney general the authority that he claimed.
I believe the Court’s general failure to invoke such federalism
doctrines in these decisions reflects (at least in part) the fact that the
decisions involved agency-administered statutes. Canons of
constructions that require Congress to speak clearly whenever it is
authorizing an agency to restrict state regulatory authority or
otherwise substantially burden the states, even if justifiable on
federalism grounds, stand in sharp contrast to the Court’s usual
approach to agency delegations. As Whitman demonstrates, the Court
ordinarily does not require Congress to clearly specify the bounds of
administrative authority, and it usually reads delegations of agency
113
rulemaking authority quite generously. Chevron epitomizes this
generous stance, with its identification of ambiguities and gaps in
114
agency-administered statutes as implicit delegations. Moreover, in a
world of concurrent authority, restrictions on state regulation and
activity seem a predictable and common result of broad delegations
of implementing authority to federal agencies—and thus hard to view
115
as categorically outside of Congress’s contemplation.
111. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
112. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006). But see Gersen, supra note 34, at 207
(arguing that, in effect, the Oregon majority relied on a modified presumption against
preemption that focuses on whether Congress has delegated authority to preempt state law).
113. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 471–73 (2002) (noting that grants of authority
to agencies to adopt rules and regulations are read broadly as including power to issue rules
with the force of law, although criticizing this practice as at odds with original congressional
understandings). A recent example of such a generous reading is AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities
Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), in which the Court relied on a general grant of rulemaking authority
to authorize the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to issue rules governing state
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, notwithstanding that the effect was to
subject the states to federal agency oversight in a traditional area of state control and concern,
id. at 377–85; see also id. at 402–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (documenting the states’
longstanding role in regulating intrastate communications).
114. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
115. In this regard, federalism canons of construction may differ from other nondelegation
canons, such as requirements that Congress speak clearly before agencies will be deemed
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3. Administrative Law as a Federalism Vehicle. The Court’s
unwillingness to impose constitutional or subconstitutional federalism
limits on Congress does not mean a lack of concern with the
implications of federal regulatory action for the states. On the
contrary, such concern surfaces repeatedly in the six decisions, in
challenges to federal agency action as well as in more traditional
federalism contexts such as preemption litigation. Critically, however,
the Court chose to address its federalism concerns from within the
broad analytic rubric of administrative law rather than through more
straightforward federalism doctrines.
The contrast between Raich and Oregon is singularly illustrative
of this point. Although unsympathetic in Raich to claims that the
CSA exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority, the Court
proceeded in Oregon to give voice to concerns about the impact of
the CSA on the states through its administrative law analysis. This
reliance on administrative law in lieu of constitutional law helps
explain the striking change in position of many of the Justices
116
between Raich and Oregon. It also sparked a plaintive complaint
authorized to apply statutes retroactively or extraterritorially, which Professor Cass Sunstein
has maintained are used to narrow agency delegations. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 331–35
(listing these and other examples). Sunstein identifies the principle that “administrative agencies
will not be allowed to interpret ambiguous provisions so as to preempt state law” as one such
canon, id. at 331, but evidence of such a principle in current case law is lacking, as demonstrated
by the continuing debate over administrative preemption, see infra note 177 (collecting cases);
see also AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 378 n.6, 397 (rejecting the claim that a presumption against
preemption should apply against the FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction to regulate state
commission implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the grounds that with the
Act, Congress “unquestionably” had limited state control over local telecommunications, and
arguing that ambiguities in the statute should yield deference to the agency’s views of its
jurisdiction under Chevron). The Court recently invoked a federalism-inspired clear statement
rule in an administrative context in Nixon v. Mo. Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004). But
Nixon stands out from the mine run of most administrative action in that the case addressed
whether a federal statute preempted a state’s regulation of local governments, rather than its
regulation of private parties—a feature that had led even the federal agency involved, the FCC,
to conclude that clear evidence of a congressional desire to preempt was required. Id. at 130–31,
141.
116. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all supported the claims of
federal power in Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198, 2209 (2005), and rejected them in Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 904, 910, 925 (2006), whereas Justice Thomas rejected the claim of federal power in Raich,
125 S. Ct. at 2222 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting), and
upheld it in Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia was the lone member to affirm federal power in both cases, see id;
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), and Justice O’Connor was the
only one to vote against federal power on both occasions, see Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 910, 925;
Raich, 126 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented in
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from Justice Thomas, who remarked in Oregon that though he was
sympathetic to the federalism argument, “that is now water over the
dam. The relevance of such considerations was at its zenith in
Raich. . . . [but such] considerations have little, if any relevance
where, as here, we are merely presented with a question of statutory
interpretation, and not the extent of constitutionally permissible
117
federal power.”
Yet given the constitutional backdrop outlined earlier in this
Section, the Court’s move to addressing federalism concerns through
an administrative law framework makes sense. Administrative law
offers a means by which the Court can raise such concerns while still
respecting Congress’s ultimate regulatory authority. Under an
administrative law framework, the Court’s scrutiny targets not
Congress but federal agencies. The central question is whether a
federal agency has overstepped its boundaries—whether by
exercising broader authority than Congress delegated, violating
statutory requirements, ignoring procedural mandates, or failing to
adequately justify its decisions. Indeed, in the administrative law
context the courts can position themselves as faithful agents of
Congress, enforcing legislative will against a recalcitrant executive
branch. Moreover, scrutinizing federal agency determinations is an
activity in which federal courts frequently engage and for which they
can draw on an established body of doctrine that also applies outside
of federalism contexts.
The decisions are less clear about exactly how administrative law
serves as a vehicle for advancing federalism concerns. Two seemingly
distinct models emerge. In one, the Court stays well within the
contours of “ordinary” administrative law, with the connection to
federalism lying simply in the fact that application of standard
doctrines redounds—or might redound—to the benefit of the states.
In the other, the Court appears to be giving federalism concerns
special salience in its administrative law analysis, deviating from
standard doctrines in ways that help protect states against federal
agency overreaching. This divergence in approach makes it difficult to
reach any firm conclusions about how the Court envisions
administrative law’s federalism role—as well as about whether the
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting), was not
on the Court when Raich was decided.
117. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Court is consciously employing administrative law to address
federalism concerns at all. Yet this divergence should not obscure the
more important point, which is the dominance of administrative law
paradigms instead of federalism doctrines in these decisions. Thus,
whether or not the Court perceives administrative law as serving a
federalism function, it is at least approaching these cases in a manner
that allows administrative law to play such a role.
B. Ordinary Administrative Law and Federalism
The decisions are notable for their frequent invocation of
ordinary administrative law principles. In particular, three standard
features of administrative law surface repeatedly: an emphasis on
administrative
procedure,
the
requirement
of
reasoned
decisionmaking, and doctrines for reviewing agency statutory
interpretations. For the most part, these staples of administrative law
analysis are not overtly connected to federalism. In practice, however,
their application served the interests of the states involved.
1. Administrative Procedure: Redress and Participation.
Administrative procedure appears often in these decisions. In some
cases, the procedures emphasized were administrative routes by
which states could seek to alter federal requirements. Thus, for
example, Raich emphasized the option of petitioning the attorney
general to have marijuana removed from Schedule I and relisted as a
118
Schedule II drug, and Massachusetts stressed that under the CAA
Massachusetts had the right to petition the EPA to issue rules
119
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Similar emphasis on the
importance of agency-level means of redress is evident in ADEC.
There, the Court underscored that the EPA was willing to reconsider
its rejection of ADEC’s BACT determination if the state submitted
additional evidence, dismissing the dissent’s fears that this amounted
120
to a “piling of process upon process.”
Administrative procedure also surfaces occasionally in these
decisions as a means of ensuring state participation and consultation
in federal agency decisions. Again ADEC is illustrative: the majority
described in detail the EPA’s repeated communications with ADEC
118. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (majority opinion).
119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 (2007).
120. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 n.21 (2004).
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over the proposed permit and the BACT determination. These
communications, it should be noted, were procedurally deficient and
121
unnecessarily oblique. What appeared to matter more to the
majority, however, was that the EPA had raised its concerns when the
state agency was formulating the permit and had suggested specific
122
ways that the state could satisfy them. By contrast, lack of
consultation is a theme the Oregon majority returned to frequently,
noting in particular that the attorney general failed to consult with
Oregon notwithstanding Oregon’s express request to meet “with
Department of Justice officials should the Department decide to
123
revisit the application of the CSA to assisted suicide.”
Procedure—its use or nonuse—thus matters to the Court,
especially the opportunities states enjoy to express their concerns to
federal agencies and potentially obtain relief. The Court is not alone
in emphasizing administrative procedure as a means of ensuring that
federal agencies consider state interests. On occasion Congress has
required that a federal agency engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking or analogous participatory procedures before displacing
124
state regulatory authority. Even more common are requirements
that federal agencies consult with state and local officials in

121. The EPA submitted its first letter on the proposed permit outside the window of the
public comment period, and appeared to act in response to points made by the National Park
Service. See id. at 508 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). And the majority itself characterized the EPA’s
orders against the state agency and the facility involved as “skeletal” and “surely . . . not
composed with ideal clarity.” Id. at 477–78, 497 (majority opinion).
122. See id. at 480, 493–94, 501.
123. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 913; see also id. at 922 (noting “the apparent absence of any
consultation with anyone outside of the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned
judgment” as a factor weighing against granting the attorney general’s views any deference).
124. See, e.g., Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12
U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000); 30 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2000) (requiring that the secretary of the interior
provide for notice and hearing in the affected state before promulgating or implementing a
federal program in lieu of state control under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act); 47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a), (d) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to preempt state law in certain
contexts but requiring that the agency proceed using notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531–32, 1535 (2006) (requiring
agencies to consider impacts on state, local, or tribal governments or the private sector for rules
that might result in an annual expenditure of $100 million or more, and for such rules to
consider alternatives and select the alternative that is “least costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome” or explain why such an alternative was not chosen). On the UMRA’s effect, see
Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript passim).
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formulating policy. In like vein, Executive Order 13,132, which in
substance dates back to President Reagan, imposes consultation and
impact assessment requirements on agencies before they issue
126
regulations with certain federalism implications.
A separate
executive order requires that regulations “specif[y] in clear language,
127
the preemptive effect, if any,” they are to be given.
Yet the six decisions give little guidance as to why exactly
administrative procedure matters from a federalism perspective. Only
in Massachusetts did the Court expressly draw a connection between
procedure and federalism, with the majority emphasizing that
Massachusetts was seeking to assert its statutory procedural rights in
arguing that the state was “entitled to special solicitude in our
128
standing analysis.” By contrast, the Raich majority insisted that the
administrative rescheduling procedure had “no relevance” to its
129
assessment of the federalism challenge raised there. Moreover, the
Raich majority nowhere mentioned that the rescheduling route was
available to the state of California (as opposed to the individual
plaintiffs in the case), which would have more clearly indicated an
intent to use administrative procedures to alleviate federalism
tensions. In ADEC and Oregon, meanwhile, use or nonuse of
procedures appears to factor primarily in the Court’s assessment of
the reasonableness of the agency actions at stake, rather than
providing an independent basis for invalidation of agency action.

125. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8508 (2006) (unemployment compensation regulations); 15 U.S.C.
§ 717b-1(b) (2006) (siting of natural gas facilities); 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512, 3312 (2006) (dispute
settlements under GATT and NAFTA); 21 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (implementation of national
drug control policy); see also Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254.
126. See Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, 3
C.F.R. 206, 209–10 (2006) (requiring, “to the extent practicable and permitted by law,” that an
agency submit an impact statement whenever a proposed regulation has federalism implications
and imposes substantial direct compliance costs on states that are not statutorily required or
preempts state law). Executive Order No. 13,132 also emphasizes the importance of early
consultation with state and local officials and of federal agencies’ relying on state standards and
regulation in policymaking generally. See id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 208.
127. See Exec. Order No. 12,988 § 3(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 157 (1996), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(2000); see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)
(requiring agencies to “respect the role of State, local, and tribal governments” by, when
feasible, consulting states before imposing federal regulatory requirements and seeking to
minimize those burdens).
128. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 (2007).
129. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 n.37 (2005).
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The lack of emphasis on notice-and-comment rulemaking further
complicates efforts to understand the role procedure plays in these
decisions. Unlike other recent administrative law precedent in which
130
such rulemaking is given central importance, in these decisions the
Court put little weight on its use (in Watters and Massachusetts) or its
nonuse (in Oregon, ADEC, and Riegel). Yet, as discussed in greater
131
depth in Part III.A,
notice-and-comment rulemaking seems
particularly conducive to ensuring that states can force federal
agencies to respond to their concerns. The lack of emphasis on it in
these decisions is thus surprising.
2. Reasoned
Decisionmaking.
More
“substantive”
administrative law doctrine also features prominently in these
132
decisions. Perhaps the most fundamental substantive administrative
law demand is that an agency must engage in reasoned
decisionmaking—in the Court’s words, an agency must “examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the
133
choice made.”
The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking
134
appears in some form in all but one of six decisions. Even

130. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350–51 (2007); Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 219–30.
132. Some would classify what I am calling substantive dimensions of administrative law—
the reasoned decisionmaking demand and deference doctrines—as procedural. See, e.g., Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1760, 1765 (2007). Probably the most accurate characterization is to acknowledge that these
administrative law requirements are both substantive and procedural: substantive, because their
most direct target is the substance of an agency’s decisions; procedural, because scrutiny of
substance will indirectly affect an agency’s procedural choices and because in some cases the
strength of scrutiny turns on the procedures an agency used. Indeed, substance and procedure
are rarely far apart in administrative law. My intent in classifying these aspects of administrative
law as substantive is simply to contrast them with instances wherein the courts focus more
directly on procedures, not to deny they also have procedural implications.
133. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
134. The exception is Watters. The omission of reference to the reasoned decisionmaking
requirement reflects Watters’s status as a preemption suit against state agency action rather than
a challenge to federal agency action, and the fact that Watters was decided on Chevron step one
grounds based on the Court’s independent reading of the statutory provisions involved, with the
Court insisting that it was not relying on the agency’s views. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
127 S. Ct. 1559, 1566, 1572 (2007).
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Massachusetts, which focused primarily on questions of statutory
interpretation, repeatedly criticized the EPA on this front, concluding
that the EPA had “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to
decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate
135
change.” The majority’s willingness to rely on this ground is
particularly striking given that the case arose out of a rulemaking
petition denial, a context in which agency policy choices usually
136
receive great deference. Reasoned decisionmaking is also an
important underlying theme in ADEC, in which the majority
repeatedly characterized the EPA’s actions in terms traditionally
137
associated with reasoned agency determinations.
Here too, the decisions do not expressly link application of the
reasoned decisionmaking requirement to federalism. Raich perhaps
comes closest, with the majority’s suggestion that marijuana’s
continued listing as a Schedule I drug under the CSA might be
arbitrary at the same time as it rejected a straightforward federalism
138
challenge to the CSA. Nonetheless, in practice, application of this

135. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007); see also id. at 1463 (arguing that
factors identified by the EPA do not “amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a
scientific judgment” and that “[i]f the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA
from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming, EPA must say so”). Oregon is more devoted to parsing statutory text than
Massachusetts, yet here too the Court makes note of factors traditionally associated with
reasoned decisionmaking—consistency, coherence, thoroughness, expertise, openness to
contrary views—in finding that the attorney general’s interpretation did not merit deference
under Skidmore. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 922 (2006). In Riegel, the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement’s appearance was far more fleeting, reflecting that like Watters the
case did not involve a direct challenge to an agency action and the Court insisted it was not
relying on the agency’s views. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005–06, 1011 (2008).
Even so, the Court noted in passing that it found the FDA’s reading of one of its own
regulations “less than compelling” and that inconsistency in the agency’s views might undercut
any deference due. Id. at 1010.
136. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459; see infra text accompanying note 148.
137. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 486, 487–91
(2004) (emphasizing the cogency and consistency of the EPA’s interpretation as well as the
limited authority the EPA claimed); id. at 495–502 (determining that the EPA’s rejection of
Alaska’s BACT determination was not arbitrary and capricious).
138. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 n.37 (2005). The Court’s 2002 decision in New
York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002), offered an even more direct linkage between reasoned
decisionmaking requirements and federalism, with the Court invoking federalism implications
in support of the agency’s policy choice. The Court there ruled that even if FERC could assert
jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions, the agency’s discretionary choice not to do so in
part because of the “implication for the States’ regulation of retail sales” was justified. Id. at 27–
28.
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basic administrative law demand served to protect state interests by
guarding against federal agency overreaching at the states’ expense.
This dynamic is evident in ADEC, even though the state was not
successful on its claims; there, the majority emphasized that the
federal courts were available to protect states against inequitable
agency conduct and then reviewed the basis for the EPA’s decision
139
fairly closely before sustaining it.
The lack of a more overt connection between the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement and state interests again leaves a
number of questions unanswered. Most importantly, does the fact
that an agency decision will substantially intrude on the states lead to
a higher burden of justification or greater scrutiny of the decision’s
underlying basis? Or to put the point in the context of Raich, does the
fact that a number of states have legalized medical use of marijuana
mean that the attorney general’s refusal to reschedule it deserves
140
more searching scrutiny than lower courts had so far applied? The
majority perhaps suggested as much by reaching out to call into
question marijuana’s Schedule I status, but it never said so directly.
3. Statutory Interpretation Doctrines. Equally evident in these
decisions is reliance on general administrative law doctrines regarding
when agency statutory interpretations trigger deference. Oregon is
the most prominent example here, with the majority insisting that
“familiar principles” guided its inquiry into the degree of deference
141
due the attorney general’s interpretive rule. But all the decisions
employed standard doctrinal frameworks to some extent in their
assessments of the merits of agency statutory interpretations. Thus, in
current administrative law parlance, Oregon is a Chevron step zero
determination because it focuses on determining whether the
attorney general was delegated authority to act with legal force on the
142
question of acceptable medical practice. Massachusetts, Watters, and

139. See ADEC, 540 U.S. at 495–502.
140. If so, Raich may signal a willingness to subject agency reasoning to greater scrutiny
than usual when it significantly burdens the states. See infra text accompanying note 166.
141. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914–15 (2006).
142. Professor Cass Sunstein has characterized Mead as adding a new step zero to the
Chevron framework. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 191 & n.20; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The
Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807,
812–13 (2002).
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Riegel, in turn, represent Chevron step one determinations.
Skidmore deference, the amorphous category of deference accorded
agency statutory interpretations not qualifying for deference under
144
Chevron, is invoked in ADEC, Oregon, and Riegel. Riegel also
references the substantial deference ordinarily accorded an agency’s
145
interpretations of its own rules.
Once again, however, no opinion expressly describes these
standard deference doctrines as means for addressing federalism
concerns. Here, it is Oregon that comes closest, with its invocation of
federalism concerns as one reason not to defer, under either Chevron
or Skidmore, to the attorney general’s interpretation of “legitimate
146
medical purpose” as excluding assisted suicide. More importantly,
in these decisions the Court subjected agency statutory
interpretations to unusually searching scrutiny, despite its invocation
147
of standard deference frameworks. Whether the Court was actually
creating a distinct approach to reviewing agency statutory
interpretations for use when agency interpretations substantially
impact the states is a question I discuss in the next Section. But that
possibility does not remove the significance of the fact that the Court

143. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (finding preemption clearly
mandated by the text of the MDA); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459–62 (2007)
(concluding that the CAA unambiguously includes carbon dioxide as an air pollutant and that
the EPA’s policy reasons for refusing to regulate carbon dioxide conflict with “the clear terms”
of the CAA); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572–73 (2007) (holding that the
NBA itself preempts state law and thus the question of deference to the OCC’s view did not
arise). Even ADEC, notwithstanding its statement that Chevron did not apply (and its
subsequent references to the reasonableness of the EPA’s view of an ambiguous provision) has
a step one air, with language suggesting the majority believed the EPA’s interpretation was the
only plausible reading of the statute:
We fail to see why Congress, having expressly endorsed an expansive surveillance
role for EPA in two independent CAA provisions, would then implicitly preclude the
Agency from verifying substantive compliance with the BACT provisions and,
instead, limit EPA’s superintendence to the insubstantial question whether the state
permitting authority had uttered the key words “BACT.”
ADEC, 540 U.S. at 490.
144. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (noting that Skidmore deference would apply were the statute
ambiguous); Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 921–22; ADEC, 540 U.S. at 487–88, 493, 496. The ADEC
majority itself did not expressly invoke Skidmore, but cited to other recent precedent that did
so. See id. at 488 (citing Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)).
145. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009. For discussions of how this same deference doctrine
surfaced (or not) in Oregon, see infra text accompanying notes 159–60.
146. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 921–25.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 151–66.
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is invoking standard administrative law doctrines for reviewing
agency statutory interpretations. At a minimum, this reinforces the
point that the Court sees these decisions predominantly through an
administrative law rubric, notwithstanding their federalism
implications.
C. Special Federalism-Inspired Administrative Law
Ordinary administrative law thus surfaces regularly in these
decisions and generally operates to protect state interests, whether or
not states prove victorious on their claims. Yet the Court’s failure to
expressly link federalism to federal administrative law raises the
possibility that this state-protective impact was unintended by the
Court. Moreover, as several of these decisions took the form of
administrative law challenges to federal agency action, the dominance
of administrative law in the decisions is not surprising. Hence,
although the connections between federalism and administrative law
in these decisions are noteworthy, it remains open whether the Court
is consciously using administrative law as a federalism surrogate.
Stronger evidence that the Court may be seeking to address
federalism concerns through administrative law comes from a number
of instances in which the decisions give special weight to federalism
concerns in their application of administrative law doctrines. The
contrast between the decisions and the more usual application of
these doctrines is striking, and federalism concerns appear to be what
explains the variation. Yet although supporting the conclusion that
the Court is using administrative law to protect state interests, it is
less clear whether these examples portend development of a distinct
form of administrative law for use when federal agency action raises
serious federalism concerns.
1. Massachusetts and Special Rules for State Standing. The most
readily ascertainable instance of the Court giving special weight to
federalism concerns is Massachusetts’s suggestion of distinct standing
rules for states. As noted in Part I.A, exactly what the majority
intends by its invocation of “special solicitude” for the states in
standing analysis is not obvious; such solicitude might mean a
generous stance in determining whether the traditional trio of
requirements for standing is met, or exempting the states from the
traditional analysis altogether when their sovereignty interests are
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implicated. What is plain, however, is the majority’s willingness to
treat the states differently from other plaintiffs in challenging federal
administrative action and to do so because of the states’ status as
sovereign entities within the federal union. In short, Massachusetts
seems to represent a federalism-inspired deviation from standard
administrative law.
Interestingly, however, the majority made no mention of
federalism in addressing another administrative law issue centrally
implicated in the case—the standard for reviewing denials of
rulemaking petitions. Although the Court stated that review of
rulemaking denials “is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential,’” it
nonetheless took a fairly aggressive interpretive stance in concluding
that section 202(a)(1) of the CAA prohibited the EPA from refusing
148
to regulate carbon dioxide on general policy grounds. Moreover, the
Court elsewhere has expressed concerns about subjecting agency
149
nonenforcement decisions to judicial scrutiny. The majority could
have justified undertaking more rigorous review of the rulemaking
denial at issue with limited precedential impact by again invoking
Massachusetts’s status as a sovereign state. Having lost its sovereign
power to regulate through statutory preemption, Massachusetts
arguably has a special right to demand review of whether the federal
government’s refusal to act accords with the governing statute. That
the majority did not make this argument raises a real question about
the extent to which it intended to create a distinct administrative law
to govern when federal action impinges on the states.
2. Heightened Substantive Scrutiny to Protect State Interests.
Aside from Massachusetts, none of the decisions expressly invoked
148. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007). For a defense of this assessment of
Massachusetts’s statutory reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 151–53.
149. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). Review of rulemaking denials is
somewhat different than review of other agency inaction, in particular agency refusal to take
enforcement action in a specific case. Agencies must offer some explanation for denying a
rulemaking petition and such denials are often accompanied by additional formalities—
including, when the agency seeks public comment on a rulemaking petition (as the EPA did in
Massachusetts), the presence of an agency record. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459; Am.
Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the practical effects of
searching judicial review of rulemaking denials are quite similar: agencies potentially would
need to devote substantial resources to justifying denials, and might be forced to undertake
rulemakings that they deemed less pressing than others. For a discussion of how resource
allocation is implicated by judicial review of agency action, see Eric Biber, The Importance of
Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 16–51 (2008).
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federalism as a reason to adopt new doctrinal rules. Yet most
appeared to deviate from standard administrative law, in particular
involving exceptionally searching scrutiny of governing statutes and
150
agency decisionmaking.
Massachusetts is one example. Section 202(a)(1), the provision
centrally at issue there, combines reference to the administrator’s
judgment with mandatory language stating that the administrator
shall set standards and seeming to significantly limit the grounds on
151
which the administrator can refuse to do so. Although the majority’s
interpretation of section 202(a)(1) as requiring that the administrator
reach a judgment on whether to set standards based on particular
factors may well be the best reading, it is hard to claim that the
provision is not ambiguous regarding the extent of the agency’s
152
discretion. Yet the Court reversed the agency on Chevron step one
grounds, concluding that the agency’s interpretation was “divorced
153
from the statutory text.”

150. An exception is Riegel, in which eight Justices agreed that the MDA’s express
preemption clause plainly required preemption of the state tort suit in question. See Riegel, 128
S. Ct. at 1006–09; id. at 1011–12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing the clarity of statutory
language as mandating preemption).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
152. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 53, 93 (noting the ambiguity in section
202(a)(1) regarding whether the administrator could refuse to make a judgment, and suggesting
that the EPA’s claim for Chevron deference was stronger than that of the government agencies
in Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), or FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000)); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 53, at 1041 (arguing that the Court’s
“review of the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate . . . was meticulous and probing”). But
see Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less Than
Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildermath, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 32, 36 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20/
LRColl2007n20Adler.pdf (arguing that the Court’s review of the EPA’s decision was not
“particularly searching or severe”).
153. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462–63. The majority also rejected the EPA’s conclusion
that carbon dioxide was not a pollutant on Chevron step one grounds, concluding “the statutory
text forecloses EPA’s reading.” Id. at 1459–60. Here the Court’s determination of statutory
clarity has more basis, for as the majority noted, see id., the statutory definition of air pollutant
is extremely broad, see 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). Yet viewing the definitional section in the context of
the regulatory scheme as a whole arguably undermines this clarity somewhat. As Justice Scalia
argued, the focus of the CAA regulatory scheme in general is on limiting ambient air pollutants
whose presence in the air varies geographically. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1475–77 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also Adler, supra note 152, at 40 (noting the majority’s rejection in
Massachusetts that “the NAAQS regulatory regime is fundamentally ill-suited to greenhouse
gas control”); Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 72 (“The NAAQS system does not seem
workable for greenhouse gases in part because states could never ensure compliance with
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The Court’s statutory analysis in Watters is another instance of an
expansive Chevron step one inquiry. The authorization for operating
subsidiaries in the NBA is oblique, resting on the statute’s grant of
“incidental powers” and a separate statute’s distinction between
154
financial subsidiaries and other subsidiaries. More importantly,
accepting that the NBA authorized national banks’ use of operating
subsidiaries, a point Michigan did not challenge, further inferences
are required to conclude that the NBA authorizes the use of statechartered operating subsidiaries or displacement of state supervision
of such subsidiaries. Notably, § 484(a), the NBA provision restricting
state oversight powers, only refers expressly to national banks
155
themselves. Perhaps, as the majority argued, the close identification
of national banks and their operating subsidiaries (embodied in a
statutory prescription that operating subsidiaries engage only in
activities national banks can engage in and conduct such activities
“subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of
156
such activities by national banks” ) justifies reading § 484(a) as
extending to operating subsidiaries. But that move is not textually
157
mandated. Instead, as the appellate courts addressing the question
had generally concluded, the NBA appears ambiguous on the
question of whether states can exercise supervisory authority over
158
state-chartered subsidiaries of national banks.
Oregon is a third example of the Court subjecting federal agency
actions to unusually searching scrutiny. Notably, the requirement that
prescriptions of controlled substances must serve a “legitimate
medical purpose” was imposed by an earlier attorney general
regulation and ordinarily administrative agencies’ interpretations of
159
their own rules receive substantial deference. But the majority
federally established concentration limits; those gases are emitted from many world-wide
sources not under their control.”).
154. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2006).
155. Id. § 484(a) (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as
authorized by Federal law . . . .”).
156. Id. § 24a(g)(3)(A).
157. See id.; Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1570–72 (2007).
158. See Nat’l City Bank v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315–18 (2d Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431
F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2005), aff’d 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris,
419 F.3d 949, 959 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005).
159. E.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give
substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”). Such deference
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refused to grant deference here on the novel ground that the
160
regulation at issue merely parroted statutory language. Similarly,
the CSA expressly delegated authority to the attorney general to
“promulgate rules and regulations . . . . relating to the registration and
161
control of the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.” Such express
delegations are usually read expansively, but the majority here was
far less generous, concluding that the attorney general’s authority was
limited to changing a substance’s classification schedule and guarding
162
against diversion. In addition, the CSA authorizes the attorney
general to deny, suspend, or revoke a physician’s registration if the
163
registration is “inconsistent with the public interest.” Terms such as
“the public interest” are frequently viewed as conveying broad
policymaking authority—indeed, the more commonly voiced concern
is that such a delegation leaves the responsible agency official
164
essentially unconstrained in setting policy. The majority, however,
viewed this provision narrowly and rejected Attorney General
Ashcroft’s claim that the provision authorized him to determine that
165
assisted suicide was not in the public interest.
Even Raich can be understood as an instance of unusually
searching scrutiny of agency decisionmaking. No petition to
today is often referred to as Auer deference, based on the decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997). See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 915 (2006).
160. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 915–16. Although perhaps a good reason not to grant deference,
this antiparroting rule was not an established “familiar principle” but instead a creation of the
Oregon majority.
161. 21 U.S.C. §§ 821, 871(b) (2000).
162. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 917.
163. 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)(4), 822(a)(2).
164. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 474–75 (2001) (noting the
often-wide scope of authority given to agencies in determining the reach of statutory terms,
including “statutes authorizing regulation in the public interest,” but emphasizing that even such
broad delegations have been found to contain constitutionally required minima of an
“intelligible principle” to guide agency discretion and thus are constitutional (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (considering the
claim that “the standard of ‘public interest’ governing the exercise of the powers delegated to
the Commission by Congress is so vague and indefinite that, if it be construed as
comprehensively as the words alone permit, the delegation of legislative authority is
unconstitutional,” but ultimately rejecting this argument).
165. Although deviating from administrative law precedent in these ways, the result in
Oregon is nonetheless defensible as a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation. The
attorney general’s broad assertion of power ill fits the CSA as a whole, which intended the
secretary of HHS and the states to play a major role in regulating medical practice. Cf.
Bressman, supra note 37, at 787 (arguing that Oregon could have been decided on Chevron step
two grounds as representing an unreasonable agency interpretation).
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reschedule marijuana was before the Court. Moreover, as the
majority noted, prior challenges to the federal government’s refusal
to reschedule marijuana had been rebuffed—not surprisingly, as the
proper listing of marijuana would seem to be the type of
determination requiring scientific expertise and touching on safety
166
concerns to which the courts usually are quite deferential. Yet the
Court went out of its way to suggest that the evidence of marijuana’s
medicinal potential might require rescheduling.
Not only did the Court undertake fairly exacting scrutiny in these
decisions, its doing so appears driven in large part by federalism
167
concerns.
For example, the Watters majority’s reliance on
independent scrutiny of the NBA instead of deferring to the OCC’s
interpretation—particularly given that both approaches produced the
same result—seems only explained as an effort to avoid the
federalism implications of administrative preemption. And the
Oregon majority was plainly concerned that the interpretive rule
168
undermined the federal-state balance embodied in the CSA.
Similarly, it is hard to explain why the Court in Raich would suggest
that marijuana’s listing as a Schedule I drug was unsupported except
to signal that administrative relisting represented a means of
navigating the specific federalism tensions in that case.
Thus, the searching scrutiny in these decisions provides evidence
that the Court is using administrative law analysis to address
federalism concerns. But use of such scrutiny in these decisions does
not clearly put them outside the pale of ordinary administrative law.
Watters and Massachusetts are hardly alone in embodying vigorous

166. For example, the courts repeatedly refused to overturn the FAA’s Age Sixty Rule,
despite their concerns about the agency’s continued adherence to the rule. See, e.g., Yetman v.
Garvey, 261 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2001); Prof’l Pilots Fed. v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 769–70 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (upholding the FAA’s Age Sixty Rule). Congress recently enacted legislation raising
the mandatory retirement age to sixty-five. Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L.
110-135, § 2(a), 121 Stat. 1450, 1450 (2007) (to be codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44729).
167. Massachusetts may be an exception; what seemed to be driving the Court in that
decision were instead separation of powers concerns—specifically, the belief that the Bush
administration was failing to comply with a clear congressional instruction because of its
differing policy views. Of course, given the importance of representation of the states in
Congress to the federalism system, it is not difficult to translate the Court’s insistence on the
executive branch’s fidelity to congressional lawmaking into federalism terms. But it is not
apparent from the decision, even with the reference to special state standing, that the Court
itself did so.
168. For a similar assessment, see Gersen, supra note 34, at 245.
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169

Chevron step one inquiries, and indeed the appropriate scope of
170
step one has long been a source of debate. Courts also vary in the
strength of their scrutiny of agency reasoning, often applying more
intense “hard look” review to notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
type of procedure involved in rescheduling decisions under the CSA
171
and emissions setting under the CAA. Moreover, courts sometimes
undertake more intensive scrutiny of agency decisionmaking when a
basis exists to conclude that politics or ideology led an agency to
172
ignore contrary facts. Nor, finally, has the Court only required
detailed evidence of an agency’s authority to regulate in federalism
173
contexts. In short, whatever its doctrinal formulae state, as a
practical matter administrative law embraces a range of deference;

169. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–61 (2000);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–29 (1994). Brown & Williamson is a
particularly interesting precursor to the Court’s approach in the federalism–administrative law
decisions. As John Manning has argued, in Brown & Williamson the Court took a narrow view
of the underlying statute, in part it appears out of constitutional nondelegation concerns
regarding the breadth of authority asserted by the agency. See John F. Manning, The
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 233–37. Yet the
Court claimed to be operating within the Chevron framework. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
159.
170. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1264–67 (2007); Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein,
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 828–29, 838 n.26 (2006); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 207, 237–42.
171. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2000) (CSA); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2000) (CAA); infra note 292
and accompanying text (commenting on the varying approaches taken by courts with respect to
the “hard look” review).
172. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49
(1983) (suggesting that the agency may have been unduly swayed by the preferences of the
automobile industry in the course of closely scrutinizing and rejecting the agency’s decision to
repeal passive restraint requirements); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 87–89
(viewing Massachusetts as hearkening back to a pre-Chevron vision of administrative law under
which independence and expertise are prized over political accountability). On the relationship
between law and politics in agency decisionmaking, see Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not
the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of
Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 322, 335 (1990).
173. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60 (holding that the FDA lacked
authority to regulate tobacco use, emphasizing that the FDA was “assert[ing] jurisdiction to
regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy” and
concluding that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion”).
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the divide between ordinary and extraordinary here is far from
174
stark.
D. Administrative Preemption
The current debate over administrative preemption merits
special note, for it is in this context that the relationship between
federalism and administrative law has surfaced most prominently.
Doctrinally, it is well established that substantive requirements
imposed by federal agencies, for example through legislative rules,
175
can preempt state law. But disagreement exists over who should
have primary authority to interpret the preemptive scope of agency
rules or the statutes agencies are charged with implementing.
Ordinarily, such agency interpretations would qualify for Chevron
deference or its equivalent, assuming that the statute or rule at issue
was ambiguous. However, the dramatic increase in agency
interpretations of statutes and rules as broadly preempting state law
(including state tort law)—a trend that became pronounced in 2006—
has led a number of scholars and jurists to conclude that agency
preemption interpretations should receive more limited Skidmore
176
deference or perhaps no deference at all. Put differently, they argue

174. For an empirical investigation documenting the range of deference the Court employs
in reviewing agency statutory interpretations, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Lauren
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
175. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154, 159–67 (1982); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
381, 383 (1961). In the past, the power of agencies to preempt state law through their
substantive enactments has also not been a source of much scholarly dispute. See, e.g., Nina A.
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 753–55 (2004) [hereinafter
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption]. But see Clark, supra note 5, at 1342–46 (arguing that
only laws adopted pursuant to Article I, Section 7 qualify as “Laws of the United States” for
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, a test that administrative regulations fail). More recently,
however, some scholars have voiced concerns about agencies’ power to preempt state law even
through their substantive enactments. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 698, 706 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson, A Presumption
Against Agency Preemption]; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW.
U. L. REV 727 (2008).
176. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1584 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 740–42; Merrill, supra note
175, at 775; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 491–98 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 869, 886–92 (2008).
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for development of a special federalism-inspired deference doctrine
for preemption contexts.
Whether (and in what way) courts should defer to agency
preemption determinations is the question the Court evaded in
Watters. The Watters majority’s reliance on an expansive Chevron
step one inquiry in lieu of deferring to the OCC might signal that
these Justices, as well as the dissenters, had doubts about the
177
appropriateness of Chevron deference in the preemption context.
On the other hand, the majority’s failure to acknowledge the unusual
breadth of its statutory investigation may indicate some ambivalence
about devising special administrative law doctrines to reflect
federalism concerns.
Although punting on this deference question, Watters and the
other decisions in the federalism–administrative law sextet carry
important implications for the administrative preemption debate. In
particular, the decisions reveal the theoretical limitations of this
debate, which tends to portray federalism and ordinary administrative
law as inherently in conflict. One effect is to downplay the possibility
that administrative law could serve as a means of reinforcing
178
federalism—and vice versa.
Although tensions exist between
177. On several prior occasions the Court has similarly avoided taking a position on the
level of deference due agency interpretations, although specific Justices have voiced positions.
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883–86 (2000) (stating that the Department of
Transportation’s position that a federal regulatory standard preempted the state tort action at
issue should be accorded “some weight,” but holding deference unnecessary to conclude that
preemption was appropriate); id. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference to
agency views raised for the first time in a legal brief is inappropriate); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 495–96 (1996) (stating that its determination that a statute did not preempt state
tort claims was “substantially informed” by federal regulations and that the agency’s views of
the statute should be given “substantial weight”); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing
that agencies should have “a degree of leeway” to determine the preemptive effect of
ambiguous statutes); id. at 512 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is not certain that an agency
regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference.”);
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (assuming arguendo that the question
of whether a statute is preemptive “must always be decided de novo by the courts”).
178. Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld are exceptions here, with their emphasis
on the way that judicial scrutiny can reinforce agency attentiveness to federalism concerns. See
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1922, 1995–99 (2008); see also Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116782
(emphasizing the importance of “provid[ing] incentives for robust norm-protection by agencies
in the first instance”). In addition, Professor Richard Nagareda has argued that concerns about
a regulatory scheme’s impact on the states could be used to reinforce the quality and efficacy of
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federalism and administrative law mindsets, the six decisions
demonstrate that the relationship between these two doctrinal lines is
much more complicated than one of straightforward conflict.
The decisions additionally suggest that the administrative
preemption debate is unduly narrow insofar as it focuses specifically
on the appropriateness of granting Chevron deference to agency
preemption interpretations. Such a focus ignores the opportunities for
addressing federalism concerns within the full Chevron inquiry, which
includes investigation of an agency’s delegated authority at step zero
(as in Oregon) and independent assessment of statutory meaning at
step one (as in Massachusetts, Watters, and Riegel). It similarly
overlooks the potential for ensuring that agencies are attentive to the
impact of their decisions on the states through arbitrary and
capriciousness review (as in ADEC and Raich). The Chevron focus
additionally means that the administrative preemption debate centers
on judicial review, when other mechanisms, such as procedural
requirements on agencies or structuring federal programs to
incorporate reliance on state administration, may well prove better
means of ensuring that federalism concerns are incorporated into
179
federal agency decisionmaking.
Finally, the focus on administrative preemption also obscures the
fact that such preemption is simply one of several instances in which
administrative law and federalism intersect. Why, for example, should
courts deny deference to express agency assessments of a statute’s
preemptive scope but then defer to agency substantive
determinations that restrict state regulatory choices? Such a
bifurcated approach would simply provide agencies with an incentive
to achieve preemption impact through substantive requirements
180
imposed by legislative rules instead of statutory interpretations.
One alternative would be to apply similar restrictions whenever
federal agency action preempts state authority. Some scholars adopt
federal regulation. See Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. art. 4, 6 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/
iss1/art4 (stating that “the real concern over FDA preemption is not the broad-brush one that it
would shut off tort litigation but, more precisely, that it might do so for too little in return” and
arguing that tort preemption concerns should be repackaged as arguments for forcing
information disclosure to the FDA).
179. See Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1565–66.
180. Recognition of this potential for manipulation has led my colleague Professor Tom
Merrill to argue for an approach that limits agency power to preempt through substantive
determinations as well as through interpretations. See Merrill, supra note 175, at 773–75.
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this view, arguing that agencies’ ability to issue preemptive
determinations—interpretive or substantive—should be limited to
instances in which Congress has clearly and specifically granted them
181
that authority. But such an approach would create extraordinary
obstacles to federal administrative governance. Given the overlapping
character of federal and state regulatory power, most substantive
determinations by federal agencies hold the potential to displace state
law; nor does it seem likely that clear congressional authorization
frequently exists for agency actions to have this preemptive effect.
Hence, this approach could threaten much of the deference currently
accorded substantive agency determinations. At a minimum,
determining whether such a radical change is justified requires
situating administrative preemption against a full assessment of the
relationship between federalism and administrative law.
III. ASSESSING THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AS A FEDERALISM VEHICLE
The discussion heretofore has focused on establishing that the
Court is increasingly attentive to the relationship between federalism
and administrative law, and further, that it may be using
administrative law as a vehicle by which to address federalism
concerns raised by federal administrative action. I now switch focus
and assess how well suited administrative law is to playing this role.
Two questions are central to such an assessment. First, how likely is
administrative law to be an adequate means of advancing federalism
concerns? Second, is it legitimate for the Court to advance state
interests through administrative law, particularly if it is not willing to
impose direct constitutional limits on the scope of federal authority?
A. Is Administrative Law an Adequate Vehicle for Addressing
Federalism Concerns?
Assessing whether federal administrative law can offer adequate
protection to state regulatory interests necessitates an account of
what adequate protection of such interests entails. In particular, does
adequacy here require success in derailing proposed administrative
181. Id. at 767 (arguing for a “super-strong clear statement rule” before “permit[ting]
agencies to preempt on their own authority”). This also is Professor Nina Mendelson’s view. See
Mendelson, Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 175, at 700–01 (arguing for a
presumption against agency preemption).
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actions that adversely impact the states, or is it sufficient to ensure
that state regulatory interests receive careful consideration by federal
officials? Although a lack of any bottom-line success would call into
question the ability of administrative law to offer meaningful
protection to federalism concerns, success cannot be the only
criterion. Such a measure is too much at odds with the basic
presumption underlying the administrative law approach, namely that
Congress has constitutional authority to regulate an activity even at
the cost of preempting or otherwise burdening the states. Instead, the
focus here, as with process federalism, necessarily must be on
ensuring that federal officials adequately consider and justify
decisions that harm state interests, not that they forego such decisions
altogether.
How well, then, does administrative law function in ensuring
sufficient agency consideration of the state interests in playing a
regulatory role and being free of federal regulatory impositions? The
record from the federalism–administrative law sextet is mixed, but
182
offers some basis for optimism. A fuller picture emerges from
taking a step back from these decisions and assessing administrative
law’s adequacy as a federalism surrogate from a more abstract
perspective. Reasons exist to be skeptical of the extent to which
agencies will protect state regulatory prerogatives. As discussed in
this Section, scholars have identified a number of institutional
182. Oregon is clearest in cautioning agencies that they must give due heed to the regulatory
role played by states in federal statutes. Massachusetts, in turn, grants states an important role in
challenging federal policy. Moreover, although the Court ruled against the state or against state
authority in the other four decisions, those decisions also preserve some openings for state
regulation. ADEC, for example, emphasized the broad discretion states exercises over granting
permits, see Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 490 (2004)
(emphasizing the “considerable leeway” to be accorded to the “permitting authority”), whereas
technically Watters precluded only state enforcement and oversight efforts, leaving the states
free “to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly
interfere with the national bank’s or national bank regulator’s exercise of its powers,” Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1567 (2007). More to the point, the fact that the Court
ultimately ruled against the states in these decisions does not mean that the administrative law
approach failed to ensure that states’ interests received sufficient consideration. Nor should the
agencies’ evident lack of sympathy for state concerns in these decisions be taken as grounds for
condemning the administrative law approach as inadequate; not only does that mistakenly
conflate agencies and administrative law, but it also ignores the way that the Court’s
development of the administrative law approach might affect agencies’ attitudes in the future.
This is not to deny that deficiencies existed in the Court’s analysis in these decisions, or that the
administrative law approach would need to be strengthened to have meaningful future effect.
See infra Part IV.
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features and failings of federal administrative agencies that may
undermine their sensitivity to state interests, such as agencies’ lack of
direct political accountability, their potential proclivity to tunnel
vision and capture by industry, and their lack of expertise on matters
of constitutional structure or values. Yet it is also easy to
underestimate the influence that the states can wield administratively
and the extent to which debates about the appropriate balance of
federal-state regulatory authority turn on questions that agencies are
particularly well qualified to answer.
Critically, moreover, administrative agencies and administrative
law are not the same thing. Administrative law involves deference to
agency decisionmaking, to be sure, but it encompasses significantly
more than that, including procedural limits on agencies and
independent judicial scrutiny in some contexts. As a result,
administrative law represents an important mechanism for improving
federal agencies’ responsiveness to state regulatory interests. More
generally, administrative law’s capaciousness and nonconstitutional,
generic character can yield important benefits for the advancement of
federalism.
1. Political Accountability and State Influence on Federal
Agencies. Skeptics of administrative preemption have identified
several reasons to doubt the extent to which agencies can adequately
protect a regulatory role for the states. First among these is the
claimed lack of political safeguards for federalism in the
administrative context. As Justice Stevens put it, “[u]nlike Congress,
administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent the
183
interests of States.” Moreover, although presidential oversight may
render agencies politically accountable to some degree, that fact does
not necessarily tie agencies to state interests. Quite to the contrary,
the president is often identified as representing national interests

183. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. L.
REV. 805, 832 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 103, at 331; Damien J. Marshall, Note, The
Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 277–78
(1998). For contrary views, see Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 758–60;
Richard J. Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power
to Preempt State Regulations, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 664 (1985).
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against the more parochial views of members of Congress. That
nationalist focus may make agencies more inclined to value
regulatory uniformity over state variation and more likely to heed the
cries of national industrial groups bemoaning the burdens of state
185
regulation. The hierarchical aspect of agencies also plays a role here
as it may serve to restrict states’ access to federal decisionmakers,
particularly compared to the multiple points of entry the states enjoy
186
in Congress.
Concerns about the states’ loss of influence in the executive
branch have some merit. But it is also easy to exaggerate the extent of
this loss. Numerous factors, such as congressional oversight, federal
officials’ ties to state regulators, lobbying by state political
organizations, and dependence on state implementation, can all serve
to give state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency
187
decisionmaking. The influence states wield by virtue of their role in
federal regulatory programs merits particular note. Studies of joint
federal-state regulatory programs indicate that the extent of state
power in these contexts has varied over the years, reflecting changes
in political climate, regulatory approaches, and perceptions of state
188
regulatory competence. These studies also document a trend toward
184. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985). But see Jede Nzebile, The Fable of the Nationalist
President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1217–23 (2006).
185. See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 362–68 (1986) (describing
agency arguments of the need for uniformity); see also Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1590–99.
186. On the importance of such multiple power bases in Congress, see generally Carol F.
Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court
Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988). For a more skeptical view of
states’ access to Congress, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1979–81.
187. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1965–68; Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back into Political Safeguards, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278–86 (2000); Mendelson, Chevron
and Preemption, supra note 175, at 768–69.
188. See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD
WASHINGTON 129–70 (1995) (providing an overview of changes in federal-state relations from
1960 through the early 1990s); Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The
Collision Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 PUBLIUS 413,
415–18, 420–22 (2007) (detailing the changed federal-state relationships in the environmental
arena under the Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations); Denise Scheberle, The Evolving
Matrix of Environmental Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 PUBLIUS 69, 75,
77–84 (2005) (describing the changed managerial approaches in federal environmental programs
that delegated greater managerial control to implementing states); Michael J. Scicchitano &
David M. Hedge, From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA,
and OSH Act, PUBLIUS, Fall 1993, at 107, 109 (noting that the initial implementation of several
federal environmental and health statutes was largely coercive toward the states but changed by
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more coercive federal-state relationships since the 1960s, with states
189
increasingly facing mandates and federal preemption. Nonetheless,
responsibility for program implementation and enforcement appears
190
to enhance state influence over federal agency decisionmaking.
Agency structure also appears relevant, with regional offices offering
an opportunity for developing closer state-federal relationships and
191
sensitivity to state interests. Such close relationships may create
internal agency support for paying attention to state needs that could
counterbalance the states’ loss of external access to federal
decisionmakers as a result of the shift of policy setting to the agency
192
context and away from Congress.
the mid- to late 1990s, with the federal and state governments coming to share responsibility
over implementation).
189. See John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 148–49 (1990); Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism
in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS 390, 390–92, 400 (2007). But see Tim Conlan, From Cooperative to
Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 663, 666–68 (2006) (arguing that the current
federal-state system is more opportunistic than coercive or cooperative because “actors . . .
pursue their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective
consequences”); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W. Bush
Administration, 37 PUBLIUS 432, 446–47 (2007) (arguing that federal-state relationships
demonstrate a continuous metamorphosis and are more complex and nuanced than descriptions
such as “coercive” or “cooperative” convey).
190. See Robert Agranoff, Managing Within the Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental
Relations Exist?, PUBLIUS, Fall 2001, at 31, 45–54; Scheberle, supra note 188, at 75–77;
Scicchitano & Hedge, supra note 188, at 114–15; Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1738–
41 (2001) (describing the influence and role of states under the 1996 Telecom Act).
191. DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 159–80, 182–83, 188 (1997).
192. State and federal regulators’ shared policy goals and professional expertise may also
work to defend a state regulatory role, but the impact of these ties is more contentious. In
particular, Professor Roderick Hills has argued that substantive policy ties between state and
federal administrators may mean that state administrators will put substantive federal policy
goals with which they agree above state institutional interests in preserving an independent state
regulatory role. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic
Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1236–37 (2001). But the same should hold true of federal
administrative officials: when state regulation may offer substantive policy benefits, federal
officials should seek to protect state regulatory authority. In this vein, Professor Nina
Mendelson has argued that federal agency officials may be particularly likely to appreciate the
national benefits that can accrue from state regulatory autonomy, for example in the way that
one state’s experimentation can yield new regulatory solutions which other states and the
national government can then pursue. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175,
at 767–68; see also Scheberle, supra note 188, at 73–75. In the end, it seems likely that whether
substantive and personal ties between federal and state administrative officials serve to protect
state regularly authority or instead undermine it will vary according to the specific program and
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2. Potential Pitfalls of Federal Agencies: Aggrandizement,
Tunnel Vision, Capture, and Lack of Expertise. Public choice and
institutional competency arguments are also raised against federal
agencies’ ability to serve as reliable representatives for state
regulatory interests. One such argument asserts that agencies are
primarily interested in expanding their own policymaking power and
achieving their programmatic goals, which sets them in conflict with
state regulatory autonomy. Another contends that agencies are overly
responsive to particular industry or other constituencies and will
privilege those constituencies’ interests over state claims to regulatory
193
authority.
A third maintains that federal agencies’ specific
programmatic focus makes them ill equipped to consider general
194
issues of the appropriate federal-state balance. Relatedly, some
scholars contend that agencies lack expertise on such questions of
195
constitutional values and general government structure.
Again, these arguments have some intuitive attraction. It is hard
to dispute the risk that federal agencies will privilege their specific
programmatic goals over more general concerns relating to
government structure, or may be unduly beholden to particular
regulated entities. After all, administrative tunnel vision and agency
196
capture are hardly unknown phenomena. It is similarly plausible

issue involved. This is not to deny, as a number of commentators have argued, that “close
cooperation among experts at the state and federal level . . . undermines the power of elected
officials at both levels,” Kramer, supra note 187, at 283 n.269, but rather to question whether
policy and professional ties necessarily work to the benefit of federal bureaucrats over state
bureaucrats.
193. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the
Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 951, 951–53 (2005) (describing the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) as
interested in “maximizing its own power and prestige” and as captured by “investment bankers
and their lawyers”); Wilmarth, supra note 84, at 295–97 (arguing that the OCC’s preemption of
state oversight and regulation resulted from the agency’s desire to expand its jurisdiction and
obtain benefits for national banks, its core constituency).
194. See Marshall, supra note 183, at 279–81; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra
note 175, at 793–97; Merrill, supra note 175, at 755–56.
195. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 779–91; Merrill, supra note
175, at 755; see also Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 793–94 (arguing
that allowing agencies to consider general federalism concerns untethered to a particular
statutory scheme raises a danger of unconstrained and thus potentially arbitrary agency
decisionmaking).
196. See, e.g., Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 781; Merrill, supra
note 175, at 727. But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The

02__METZGER.DOC

2078

9/30/2008 2:05:45 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:2023

that at least in some contexts federal agencies view state regulators as
competitors and seek to use preemption to advance their institutional
197
interests. The spate of aggressive preemption efforts by numerous
different agencies during the Bush administration—the OCC, FDA,
Consumer Product Safety Administration, the National Highway
Safety Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration—
raises real concerns about the potential for federal bureaucratic
198
empire building at the expense of the states.
Yet public choice accounts of agency motivation become unduly
simplistic, to the extent that they portray federal agency officials as
motivated solely by desire for greater resources and power without
199
consideration of what represents the best regulatory policy. It also is
mistaken to think that agency self-interest always lies on the side of
expanding federal regulatory power at state expense. Even in public
choice terms that account rings hollow, as the potential for
congressional retaliation or the desire to avoid new responsibilities
may lead rational agency officials to a different account of where their
200
parochial interests lie. The view that agencies will advance the
interests of favored regulatory constituencies at the expense of the
201
states is similarly oversimplified. Too many instances exist of

Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 130–32 (2005)
(arguing that fears of agency capture are often exaggerated).
197. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 84, at 276–77 (providing evidence supporting the claim
that recent OCC preemption efforts were affected by the OCC’s desire to expand the number of
banks with national bank charters and thereby expand the fees the OCC collects).
198. For a description of these proposals, see Sharkey, supra note 3, at 230–42. For a
discussion of bureaucratic empire building more generally, see Daryl J. Levinson, EmpireBuilding Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 942 (2005).
199. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 26–31
(2000); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L.J. 97, 121–23 (2000); Stephenson, supra note 196, at 129–35.
200. Levinson, supra note 198, at 923–37; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note
175, at 796; Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that
Delimit the Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 982 (1994).
201. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spitzer Legacy and the Cuomo Future, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
20, 2008, at 5 (arguing that regulatory capture accounts of the SEC fail to adequately describe
the agency); see also Stephenson, supra note 196, at 131 (stating that “recent research suggests
that the ‘agency capture’ problem has been wildly overstated” and that “[t]he risk of capture is
also less acute when an agency has a broad jurisdiction, as such agencies respond to (and draw
their personnel from) multiple constituencies with competing interests”). At a minimum,
whether agency capture works to the detriment of state regulatory interests seems likely to turn
on the extent to which states are an important constituency of the agency. See supra note 190
and accompanying text; see also Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1565–66.
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federal agencies refusing to preempt or seeking to expand state
regulatory autonomy to conclude that federal agencies are
categorically insensitive or hostile to preserving a state regulatory
202
role. This is not to deny that federal agencies are able to aggrandize
themselves at the expense of the states when so inclined. But the fact
that federal agencies frequently are not so inclined merits emphasis,
and underscores that the explanation for federal agency behavior is
more complicated.
One crucial variable the public choice account omits is politics.
An agency’s political agenda is likely to affect whether the agency will
seek to accord states a regulatory role or instead centralize control in
Washington. Thus, recent efforts to preempt state tort actions are in
line with the Bush administration’s support for tort reform and
203
restrictions. At least some of these preemption efforts were rejected
under prior presidential administrations with different political
204
agendas. Indeed, politics rather than institutional position often
202. See Gersen, supra note 34, at 235; Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in
the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Account, 2006 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 73
(noting that during the Rehnquist Court, the solicitor general only took “a pro-preemption
position in 39 of 95 preemption cases, or about 40 percent”); Sharkey, supra note 176, at 475–76.
203. Opponents of these regulatory measures see them in terms of the administration’s
general support for limits on tort actions. See, e.g., William Funk et al., The Truth About Torts;
Using Agency Preemption to Undercut Consumer Health and Safety, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM PUBLICATION, Sept. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
Truth_Torts_704.pdf (“In recent years, the Bush administration has launched an unprecedented
aggressive campaign to persuade the courts to preempt state tort actions.”); Stephen Labaton,
‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5. The White
House, not surprisingly, denies the charge that these preemption proposals “reflect a concerted
administrative policy.” Caroline E. Mayer, Rules Would Limit Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
2006, at D1. It is worth noting that some of the regulations involve agencies headed by
independent commissions rather than simply agencies led by presidential political appointees,
complicating the claim that they represent a Bush administration initiative. On the other hand,
the use of preemption appeared to grow significantly since 2006, a time by which President Bush
would have been able to significantly affect the membership of most independent agencies, and
independent agencies are often quite responsive to presidential policy preferences. See
Bressman, supra note 132, at 1807–08 (describing presidential influence over independent
agencies).
204. See OCC, Investment Securities; Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate
Activities; Bank Activities and Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,092, 60,095 (Nov. 4, 1999) (refusing
to state in rulemaking under the Clinton administration that the OCC’s supervisory jurisdiction
over national bank operating subsidiaries is exclusive, a position the OCC subsequently adopted
under the Bush administration, see OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 60 Fed. Reg. 1,895,
1,900–01 (2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34(e)(3), 7.4006 (2008))); David A. Kessler & David
C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461, 463 (2008) (emphasizing that the FDA’s current view that state failure-to-warn
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seems to be the driving force behind federal administrative
limitations on (or deference to) the states. In that regard, agencies
205
appear little different from Congress or even the courts.
As that suggests, the real issue here is one of comparative
institutional competency. Which institution—Congress, federal
agencies, or the courts—is best situated to make the relevant political
choices? Which will give greatest weight to preserving a meaningful
206
state regulatory role? Constitutionally, Congress is the federal
institution with primary policy-setting responsibility, and Congress is
207
also the institution most structured to represent state interests. Yet
it is not clear that Congress offers significantly more sensitivity to

cases involving drugs are preempted represents “a seismic shift in FDA policy”); see also
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1449–50 (2007) (noting that the EPA’s general counsels
in 1998 and 1999, during the Clinton administration, had taken the view that the EPA had
authority to regulate carbon dioxide under the CAA, a view the agency subsequently rejected in
2003 under the Bush administration); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 913–14 (2006) (noting
that President Clinton’s attorney general, Janet Reno, in response to a request for enforcement
made by (among others) then-Senator John Ashcroft, had concluded that the Department of
Justice lacked authority to determine that assisted suicide did not constitute legitimate medical
practice—a view that Ashcroft later reversed when he became attorney general under President
Bush). But see Coffee, supra note 201 (expressing skepticism that politics alone determines the
level of SEC enforcement).
The Bush administration’s greater responsiveness to these preemption proposals
compared to the Clinton administration underscores that traditional identifications of
Republicans as favoring state rights and Democrats as advocating national power are becoming
outdated. See generally Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the
Transformation of American Conservativism, 37 PUBLIUS 279 (2007) (identifying the Bush
administration as supportive of centralization over federalism and tying this to ascendancy of
social and economic conservativism domestically and neoconservatism in foreign affairs).
205. On politics dominating over federalism principles in Congress, see Conlan, supra note
189, at 667, 671; Hills, supra note 108, at 36. On politics dominating over federalism principles in
courts, see Richard Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 432, 469 (2001). Additionally, one study found “a significant
ideological component” in judicial federalism decisions, although it also noted that “honest
federalism” could be playing a strong role. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three
Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 741, 768 (2000).
206. Scholarship on administrative preemption has emphasized the centrality of this point
concerning comparative institutional competency. See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178,
at 1948–84; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 779–94; Merrill, supra note
175, at 753–58. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the need to
assess institutional competence in comparative perspective).
207. See Merrill, supra note 175, at 753; see also Clark, supra note 5, at 1331.
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state regulatory prerogatives than federal agencies do. In any event,
insisting that Congress itself resolve all federal-state questions is a
nonstarter. Congress simply lacks the resources and foresight to
resolve all the federalism issues that can arise in a given regulatory
scheme. Requiring Congress to do so would impose a significant
obstacle to federal regulation, something the Court’s delegation cases
209
indicate it is not prepared to do.
As a result, in many ways the critical comparison is between
federal agencies and federal courts; given that Congress will delegate
broadly, one of the other institutions will need to resolve the
210
federalism disputes that inevitably will arise. Moreover, it is hard to
contest that of these two, agencies are more competent to make overt
211
political choices. Yet a case nonetheless could be made that the
courts have a comparative advantage over agencies in resolving
federalism questions. Unlike specialized, program-focused agencies,

208. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 768, 759–69 (arguing that
Congress’s regional structure gives it “no special advantage in considering . . . more ‘national’
federalism benefits” and that “it is unclear why members of Congress would have any special
incentive (beyond their incentive to respond to officials of their particular state) to respond to
the . . . views” of state organizations like the National Governors’ Association); see also Note,
New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1605 (2007)
(noting that “Congress almost never responds to the Court’s preemption decisions”); supra text
accompanying notes 187–92 (describing state influence over agencies).
209. The fact that in none of the federalism–administrative law sextet of decisions did the
Court expressly rely on devices such as clear statement rules or the presumption against
preemption reinforces this point, as these devices might be thought of as means to ensure that
Congress itself resolve federalism disputes. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 619–29,
631 (describing clear statement rule devices); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note
175, at 759 (arguing that the presumption against preemption could be seen “as a method of
ensuring that Congress itself makes the preemption decision”); see also supra Part II.B.
210. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 251–52.
211. Even scholars who advocate treating courts “as the primary institution for resolving
preemption controversies” agree. Merrill, supra note 175, at 759; see also Bamberger, supra note
178 (manuscript at 33–34) (arguing that agencies are more aware and sensitive to congressional
policy preferences than courts); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1981–85 (emphasizing
agencies’ susceptibility to influence by the political branches). Although administrative law
scholars dispute the role that presidential political priorities should play in agency
decisionmaking, the debate is over how much weight to give such priorities, rather than over
whether politics should have any influence on agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–46 (2001) (arguing in favor of strong
presidential oversight); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President
in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 697–705, 738–60 (2007) (emphasizing the
distinction between presidential guidance and oversight and presidential assertion of primary
decisional responsibility and arguing against the latter).
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the federal courts are generalist institutions that have special
212
responsibilities to enforce constitutional structures and values. In
practice, however, it is not at all clear that the federal courts have
been more sensitive to state regulatory interests than agencies have
been, and at times courts have been strong enforcers of federal
213
uniformity over state control. Indeed, several commentators have
noted the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to curtail state regulatory
214
authority in a variety of contexts.
This leaves for consideration the claim that agencies simply lack
expertise in determining the proper balance between federal and
state regulation, particularly as compared to courts. Here, much turns
on how the question of expertise is framed. Agencies have no special
claim to expertise in assessing the proper federal-state balance in the
abstract, divorced from a particular regulatory scheme or statute. But
federalism disputes are unlikely to surface in such a form—whether
before agencies, the federal courts, or Congress. Instead, as the
federalism–administrative law sextet suggests, these questions arise in
particular regulatory contexts. In such contexts, questions about the
appropriate federal-state balance are not easily separated from
substantive policy determinations on which agencies do have
215
expertise. ADEC is illustrative: The strength and legitimacy of the

212. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 787–88; Merrill, supra note
175, 757–58.
213. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 108, at 1356–57; Weiser, supra note 190, at 1705–
08.
214. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action
During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1306–07 (2002); Fallon, supra note 205, at 432,
469 (noting the lack of a consistent state prerogative thread in Rehnquist Court decisions and
concluding that the driving force was instead conservatism); Meltzer, supra note 107, at 367–68,
376; see also Young, supra note 4, at 23–32 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court emphasized
formal sovereignty over substantive power).
215. See Bamberger, supra note 178 (manuscript at 32–33); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note
178, at 1967–68. This seems to me equally true of preemption decisions; all that is needed to
translate a preemption question into a clear policy choice is consideration of whether state
regulation is an obstacle to achieving federal regulatory goals. As Professor Catherine Sharkey
has written, “[w]ith respect to answering the key regulatory policy issue at the heart of the
preemption query—namely, whether there in fact should be a uniform federal regulatory
policy—federal agencies emerge as the institutional actor best equipped to provide the answer.”
Sharkey, supra note 176, at 477; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that agency responsibility for administering a statute “means
informed agency involvement and, therefore, special understanding of the likely impact of both
state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to which)
state requirements may interfere with federal objectives”). But see Merrill, supra note 175, at
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state dignity concerns asserted there cannot be assessed in isolation
from the importance of EPA oversight of state BACT determinations
to achieving the CAA’s goals, a question on which the EPA has the
relevant expertise. Indeed, framed in terms of particular contexts,
agencies likely will have greatest expertise on the specific question of
216
how best to balance federal-state regulatory roles. The difficulty in
separating substantive policy and federalism also undermines the
institutional competency arguments in favor of courts, for courts are
comparatively ill-equipped to assess the substantive impact that
217
preserving a state role may have on a particular regulatory regime.
3. Administrative
Law’s
Procedural
and
Substantive
Requirements.
The foregoing suggests that claims of agency
insensitivity to state interests may well be exaggerated. Instead, a real
possibility exists that agencies might in fact play a federalismenforcing role—and even do so comparatively more effectively than
courts. Equally important is the distinction between agencies and
administrative law. Administrative law traditionally has served as a
basic mechanism for policing against agency capture and selfaggrandizement, as well as against the excessive politicization of
218
administrative decisionmaking. Thus the issue is not simply whether
749–50 (emphasizing the extent to which preemption determinations involve general
constitutional questions of the proper balance between federal and state governments).
216. While this may be particularly true in regard to cooperative regulatory schemes, which
by their nature entail substantial interaction between the two levels of government, it is also
true even when federal and state regulation is largely independent. See Gersen, supra note 34, at
233; Pierce, supra note 183, at 664; Sharkey, supra note 176, at 485–90 (discussing federal
expertise on regulatory impact of state tort law). Nor can federal insensitivity to state authority
be presumed in contexts in which federal and state regulators are rivals. State regulation may in
fact serve federal interests, for example by allowing federal regulators to redirect their oversight
activities or save on enforcement costs. Whether federal administrators can benefit from state
efforts depends on the regulatory policy and goals of federal and state governments being
similar—but conflicting policies would seem to be a fair (as in jurisdictionally neutral) grounds
for federal officials to be concerned about state actions. And even when policy conflict exists,
other factors, such as congressional oversight or political ramifications more generally, may
ensure that federal agencies accommodate state concerns.
217. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1968; Merrill, supra note 175, at 758.
218. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 60, 87 (arguing that Massachusetts
represented an attempt to check “politicization of [agency] expertise” and arguing that this
expertise-forcing approach “hearkens back to an older, pre-Chevron vision of administrative
law in which independence and expertise are seen as opposed to, rather than defined by,
political accountability”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 19671983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050–52 (1997) (describing the development of agency
capture concerns and their influence on the courts in the period 1967–1983); Robert L. Rabin,
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agencies will be appropriately sensitive to state interests on their own,
but rather whether administrative law offers adequate protection
against agency failure to take federalism concerns seriously.
One central means by which administrative law may do so is in
the procedural requirements it imposes on agency action, in particular
the opportunities for state notification and participation created by
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and amplified by
substantive requirements of agency explanation and reasoned
219
decisionmaking. From a political perspective, notice-and-comment
rulemaking offers a means by which states can learn of pending
agency action that might harm their interests and inform their
220
political allies in Congress. Especially interesting here is Congress’s
inclusion in several statutes of notice-and-comment rulemaking or its
equivalent as a prerequisite before an agency can displace a state
221
regulatory role. This suggests that, at a minimum, members of
Congress—or state groups lobbying Congress—consider such
procedures to offer some protection against encroachments on state
regulatory authority. From a more legal and agency-functioning
viewpoint, notice-and-comment rulemaking offers a means of
222
ensuring agencies are informed of and respond to state concerns.
The relative formality and centralized aspect of notice-and-comment

Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1300, 1308–09, 1315 (1986)
(linking the emergence of more searching judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions to
suspicions about agency good faith and competency).
219. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). For similar views, see Bamberger, supra note 178
(manuscript at 35–36); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2006–11; Mendelson, Chevron and
Preemption, supra note 175, at 777–78; Merrill, supra note 175, at 755, 764–65.
220. Positive political theory views administrative procedure as a means of assisting
congressional oversight and protecting against bureaucratic drift. See Bressman, supra note 132,
at 1767–76 (describing positive political theory and noting some criticisms of its account);
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON & ORG. 243, 259–60 (1987); Matthew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440–44
(1989).
221. See supra note 124.
222. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1949–55; Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with
Your Chevron? Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
823, 874 (1995); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 777–78; Merrill, supra
note 175, 764–65.
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rulemaking also helps ensure that agency determinations are made
223
after considerable deliberation and review.
Professor Nina Mendelson has correctly insisted that the ability
of states to protect their regulatory interests through notice-andcomment rulemaking is largely an empirical question, as are claims
about the extent of state influence on federal agency
224
decisionmaking. Although public administration scholarship offers
studies of many aspects of federal-state relationships, surprisingly
little empirical evidence exists on federal-state interactions in
rulemaking and other procedural contexts of particular relevance to
225
administrative law. Studies do exist documenting federal agencies’
failure to take seriously the federalism assessment obligations
imposed by Executive Order 13,132, which suggests that notice-andcomment rulemaking may not actually yield significant federalism
226
benefits. On the other hand, the executive order expressly states
that it is “not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or
227
procedural, enforceable at law,” which makes it a poor basis on
which to draw conclusions about the federalism impact of judicially
228
enforceable requirements.
223. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 541–42 (2003); Nagareda, supra note 178, at 45–46.
224. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 758–59.
225. See id. Moreover, useful quantifiable data may be hard to produce, given that some
quantifiable measures, such as agency responses to state comments in the preambles of final
rules, id. at 776 n.164, may be prone to agency manipulation. As a result, detailed case studies of
states’ influence on particular regulatory initiatives might prove the most profitable.
226. See L. NYE STEVENS, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99093t.pdf (reporting that only five federalism
impact statements were prepared in conjunction with issuance of 11,000 final rules between
April 1996 and December 1998); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 783–
85 (sampling 600 proposed or final rulemakings in a three-month period and finding that only
six federalism impact statements had been prepared by agencies, with none of these
acknowledging the “value of preserving state regulatory prerogatives”); Mendelson, A
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 175, at 695 (sampling 485 proposed and
final rulemakings in a three-month period and finding only three in which the agency concluded
that a federalism impact assessment was required); see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R.
206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (requiring impact statements).
227. Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 11, 3 C.F.R. at 211. Whether such an order could create
enforceable rights need not be considered here.
228. Anecdotal evidence also exists of notice-and-comment requirements having a stateprotective impact. For example, the Department of Homeland Security retracted its initial
broad preemption position regarding the security at chemical plants after receiving a number of
critical comments. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2014–15.
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Hence, perhaps the fairest conclusion is that the jury is still out
with respect to whether notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
in practice yield significant federalism-enforcing benefits.
Nonetheless, this potential exists at least in theory and could be
reinforced by other means, such as the substantive requirements
administrative law imposes on agency decisionmaking. Agencies must
respond to significant comments not simply to fulfill the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural demands, but also
to avoid having courts find their determinations arbitrary and
capricious. The effect is to create significant obligations of
229
explanation for agencies. Express invocation of state interests is also
relatively easily included within an administrative law framework, as
a presumptively relevant factor that agencies must consider in their
decisionmaking. The states’ constitutional significance alone seems
sufficient ground on which to require that agencies consider and
justify the impact of a proposed regulation on the states’ regulatory
role, at least absent indication that Congress intended agencies to
230
ignore this factor. But at a minimum, statutory provision for a state
regulatory role—for instance, in cooperative regulatory schemes or
savings clauses limiting preemption—provides a firm basis for
requiring that agencies take seriously the impact a proposed
regulation will have on the states. Finally, these procedural and
substantive requirements may create incentives for an agency to
consult with states early on, before the agency has promulgated a
proposed rule and at a time when it may be most receptive to
231
alternatives.
4. The Capaciousness of Administrative Law.
A second
important advantage of administrative law is its institutional and
doctrinal capaciousness. Administrative law is institutionally
capacious because it includes rules that govern the actions of multiple
institutions—controlling not only internal agency actions, but also
external review of agency actions by courts. Indeed, administrative
law in some ways even encompasses Congress, as it addresses
229. See supra text accompanying notes 132–37.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 257–59. As noted above, agencies are required to
assess and justify impact on the states under Executive Order No. 13,132, see supra note 126, but
the Executive Order is not itself judicially enforceable, Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 11, 3 C.F.R. at
211.
231. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2011.
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Congress’s constitutional ability to design agencies and control their
decisionmaking and also contains elaborate doctrines of statutory
interpretation. Administrative law is also doctrinally capacious, and in
particular includes prescriptions for both deference and searching
scrutiny. Courts need not step outside existing doctrinal frameworks
to rein in agencies perceived to be overreaching or insufficiently
sensitive to significant state interests.
This institutional and doctrinal breadth allows administrative law
to draw on the federalism-reinforcing aspects of both agencies and
courts. For example, by independently scrutinizing the scope of
power Congress has delegated to an agency, courts can guard against
agency overreaching at the expense of the states. Substantive scrutiny
of agency reasoning can flush out instances of agency capture and
other failures in agency functioning. Yet requiring that courts defer to
well-reasoned administrative determinations within this range of
delegated authority also allows room for agencies to exercise some
discretion on federalism matters. Moreover, by forcing an agency to
provide notice of actions it plans to take, procedural requirements
empower congressional oversight and thus reinforce such political
safeguards as Congress has to offer.
Extolling administrative law’s doctrinal capaciousness as a
federalism virtue is more than a little ironic. It is precisely this
feature—the fact that administrative law offers judges a number of
doctrinal options—that many administrative law scholars identify as
its fundamental flaw. Their complaint is that this breadth translates
232
into essentially unconstrained power in reviewing courts. That
complaint is very relevant here, because it suggests that in practice
232. These complaints are raised, for example, in commentary on Chevron and ossification
of rulemaking. The former tends to stress the danger that judges will impose their own preferred
policies in lieu of the agencies’, thereby undermining political accountability and principled
decisionmaking. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208–11 (2006); Frank B. Cross, Essay,
Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1304–05, 1308–10 (1999); see also Merrill,
supra note 142, at 819–21 (arguing for a clearer rule-based approach to determining when
Chevron applies); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 825–27. The latter tends to focus on the
harmful effects potentially broad-ranging judicial review has on agency functioning, such as
requiring agencies to devote substantially greater resources to rulemaking or forego it
altogether, as well as on how judges’ lack of substantive knowledge and expertise undermines
their ability to review agency action intelligently. See Cross, supra, at 1332; Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387–
96, 1400–03 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60–62 (1995).
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administrative law is not that institutionally capacious at all; in the
end, the courts call the shots across the board. Some might contest the
claim that administrative law is capacious even if courts do succeed
(at least sometimes) in combining independent scrutiny with
deferential review. The problem is that on any given issue one
institution—court or agency—will dominate.
Despite these objections, administrative law’s breadth still offers
a potential federalism payoff. Much scholarship has identified the
ways that judicial review—for better or worse—indirectly influences
233
how agencies operate,
and even if Chevron is only softly
constraining, it nonetheless may lead judges to defer to agency policy
234
choices in some contexts. Limited impacts such as these suffice to
conclude that some potential exists to harness the federalismreinforcing aspects of both courts and agencies through
administrative law.
In any event, judicial ability to manipulate administrative law
doctrine seems unlikely to work significantly against the regulatory
interests of the states. Consider in this regard the Court’s decision in
Watters. Chevron’s malleability, specifically the potential
expansiveness of the step one inquiry, is prominently on display. But
it is harder to imagine the Court reading the NBA so expansively had
the OCC concluded preemption was inappropriate. Indeed, in none
of the six decisions did the Court use its independent judgment to
undermine state regulatory interests in the face of state-protective
233. For arguments that judicial review improves agency decisionmaking, see William F.
Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59–60 (1975); Mark
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490–91, 522–26, 543–47 (2001). For arguments that judicial review is
harmful, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
224–28 (1990); Pierce, supra note 232, at 65–66, and see also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION
AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 294–98 (1983).
234. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 856–58 (noting that although judges often vote
with their political preferences, panels including at least one judge nominated by a Republican
president and one judge nominated by a Democratic president exhibit a tendency to vote less
along party lines in Chevron cases); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 911 n.71 (2008)
(summarizing scholarship on Chevron’s effect and noting studies “suggest[ing] that courts
overwhelmingly defer to agency action”); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, Studying
Administrative Law: A Methodology for, and Report on, New Empirical Research, 42 ADMIN. L.
REV. 519, 533 (1990) (reporting early evidence of Chevron’s effect and concluding that courts
were more likely to affirm agency decisions after Chevron); see also Pauline T. Kim, Lower
Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 385–86 (2007) (emphasizing the limits of purely
political accounts of judicial behavior).
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agency action. Empirical studies of preemption offer further support.
Notably, the federal government’s opposition significantly reduces
235
the likelihood that the Court will find preemption.
Put somewhat differently, if assertions of the federal courts’
greater institutional competency and sensitivity on federalism matters
are true, then the courts’ ability to manipulate deference doctrines
should operate in federalism’s favor. The real danger is that these
assertions may not be true and that, on the contrary, states’ interests
would be best advanced by more thoroughgoing judicial deference to
agency decisionmaking. If so, however, that would merely underscore
the importance of the administrative component of administrative
law, rather than call the possibility of administrative law serving as a
federalism surrogate into question.
5. The Normalizing Function of Administrative Law. A final
advantage of administrative law as a means for advancing federalism
concerns is administrative law’s nonconstitutional and generic
character. Many administrative law doctrines reflect constitutional
values and concerns, such as fears of unchecked and irrational
236
exercises of coercive power. Nonetheless, these doctrines are rarely
understood to be constitutionally mandated, but instead are viewed as
237
largely subject to alteration by Congress. Administrative law is also
generic, in that (absent congressional specification to the contrary) it
applies to all federal agency actions, not simply those actions that
raise federalism concerns.
As suggested in Part II.A, both of these traits may well make
courts more willing to enforce federalism values through an
administrative law lens than through a more overtly constitutional or

235. See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Account, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 57, 73–74 (2006) (noting that
the probability of “an anti-preemption outcome is highly likely . . . when the [solicitor general]
argues against preemption,” although “preemption litigation in the Supreme Court [was] by and
large a fifty-fifty proposition” during the period); see also Sharkey, supra note 176, at 455
(“[T]he influence of the relevant federal agency’s position may be a better predictor of
outcome.”); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1177–78 (1999)
(noting that although federal agencies rarely took a position on preemption challenges before
the federal appeals courts, “[w]hen they did . . . they appear to have swayed the courts”).
236. See Bressman, supra note 223, at 497–503.
237. See id. at 462–63, 494–95.
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To begin with, raising federalism
federalism-driven analysis.
concerns through the administrative law rubric does not erect a
permanent barrier to federal administrative action; instead, at most it
triggers a requirement of additional congressional enactment. More
significantly, judicial rejection of an agency decision often does not
serve to take decisional authority away from the agency at all, but
rather results in a remand for further administrative consideration.
The generic nature of ordinary administrative law may reinforce
judicial willingness to scrutinize federal actions that burden the states
because it allows courts to bypass questions about the legitimacy of
limiting federal regulation on federalism grounds. Instead, like the
Oregon majority, courts can claim to be motivated by “familiar
239
principles” that are not tied to the subject of federal-state relations.
This nonconstitutional and generic character makes
administrative law also particularly well suited for addressing the
central challenge of contemporary federalism: ensuring the continued
relevance of states as regulatory entities in contexts marked by
concurrent federal-state authority and an extensive national
administrative state. As argued in Part II.A, under current
constitutional doctrines, little private activity falls outside the federal
government’s regulatory power and what does is reachable through
240
federal conditional spending. Thus, if federalism is to succeed in
preserving a regulatory role for the states, it has to come into play in
241
contexts of concurrent authority. In such contexts, however, direct
constitutional challenges are unlikely to do much work other than at
242
the margins. Combine all this with judicial unwillingness to impede
Congress’s ability to delegate responsibility for policy setting to
238. See supra Part II.A.3.
239. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914 (2006).
240. See supra Part II.A.1.
241. For similar views that ensuring federalism’s relevance in instances of concurrent
authority is critical, see Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 795, 796–99 (1996); Hills, supra note 108, at 4; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 248, 287 (2005); Young, supra note 4, at 41, 106–07.
242. The anticommandeering rule is an example. Although this rule prohibits the federal
government from forcing state officials to implement federal programs, see Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), its practical effect is more limited given the ability of the federal
government to make such state implementation a condition of funding, see South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96
MICH. L. REV. 813, 871–75 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the anticommandeering
rule and spending doctrine).
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administrative agencies, and it seems that federalism will play a quite
limited role if kept to the form of a constitutional or subconstitutional
trump on federal action.
Instead, for federalism to have continued vibrancy as a governing
principle, it needs to be “normalized” and consciously incorporated
into the day-to-day functioning of the federal administrative state.
Using administrative law to ensure that federalism concerns are met
represents a central mechanism for achieving this incorporation. If
successful, federalism becomes an everyday consideration, one that
agencies must take seriously and accommodate yet also one they have
authority to override provided they adequately justify the need to do
so. Federalism loses trumping status, but gains everyday relevancy.
Given federalism’s limited trumping success, this trade-off seems
worthwhile.
B. The Legitimacy of Administrative Law’s Use as a Federalism
Vehicle
Administrative law thus holds significant federalism-enforcing
potential, offering a mechanism for ensuring that agencies seriously
consider state regulatory interests. But that administrative law may
prove to be a particularly effective vehicle for addressing federalism
concerns does not mean that using administrative law in this fashion
is a legitimate judicial undertaking. In particular, the administrative
approach is open to criticism as an unjustified intrusion on
congressional power, given that the Court is unwilling to curb
Congress’s regulatory authority on constitutional grounds. Arguably,
if Congress acts within its constitutional powers in regulating an area
and in delegating responsibility to administrative agencies to
implement its regulatory scheme, then courts lack a basis for
imposing additional federalism-inspired restrictions on subsequent
243
agency determinations. Several critics have raised similar legitimacy
244
concerns regarding the presumption against preemption, clear

243. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 633–36 (describing the argument against
enforcing federalism indirectly through clear statement rules). The classic statement of this line
of argument, raised in conjunction with the constitutional avoidance canon, is in RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 285 (1985).
244. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 108, at 2097–100; Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs
Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 182–87; Nelson, supra note 108, at 290–303. Of course, the
presumption against preemption also has its defenders. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 241, at
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245

and other process requirements imposed on
statement rules,
246
Congress in the name of federalism. Albeit analytically distinct in
important ways, given its primary focus on agency action, the
administrative law approach is similarly cognizable as a species of
subconstitutionalism: it represents an effort to promote constitutional
federalism values through means other than direct imposition of
constitutional prohibitions.
This legitimacy complaint has little force if the administrative law
approach only involves the Court employing ordinary administrative
law in a manner that redounds to the states’ benefit. In such a case,
invocation of federalism is not necessary to justify the results the
247
Court reaches, and the basis for the Court’s actions is the same as
248
that which underlies its review of administrative action generally.
Even express invocation of federalism, if kept within the established
parameters of ordinary administrative law, seems unproblematic. To
798–99; Young, supra note 105, at 1385–86; see also Hills, supra note 108, at 17–36 (defending a
clear statement antipreemption rule).
245. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 232, at 1329 (arguing that “process-based clear
evidence/clear statement” approaches threaten “judicial cooptation of political authority at the
expense of Congress”); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 633–39 (noting the danger that
clear statement rules represent “backdoor curtailment” of congressional power and
underscoring the countermajoritarian impact such rules can have in practice).
246. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 328, 369–89 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s imposition of procedural requirements on
Congress violates separation of powers and ignores how Congress operates); William W.
Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 90–91 (2001)
(characterizing the imposition of legislative record requirements on Congress as an “unjustified
and unworkable judicial arrogation of legislative authority”); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney,
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 116–23 (2001) (contending that judicially imposed
legislative record requirements undermine Congress’s status as a coequal branch and curtail
congressional effectiveness and accountability). Some commentators draw a distinction between
clear statement requirements, which they support, and legislative record or deliberation
requirements, which they view as undesirable and inconsistent with how Congress functions.
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1740–50 (2002).
247. Cf. Manning, supra note 169, at 254 (“[The] canon of constitutional avoidance does no
work unless used to depart from the most likely or natural meaning of a statute.”).
248. Of course, judicial review of administrative action can also be critiqued as lacking basis
in constitutional or statutory text—and sometimes is. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common
Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 118 (1998). For examples, see United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–43 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 547–48 (1978). But such criticisms are not
unique to review of administrative action that implicates federalism concerns, and so are
(largely) outside the scope of this Article.
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conclude that any express invocation of federalism in review of
agency action represents judicial usurpation of Congress’s policysetting role requires the highly dubious presumption that, unless it
says otherwise, Congress prefers that agencies not take state interests
into account at all.
But the legitimacy critique is also unpersuasive in regard to the
creation of special administrative law doctrines to protect state
interests, notwithstanding that here federalism values are used to
justify imposition of unusual constraints on agency action. To begin
with, subconstitutionalism is a common feature of the American legal
landscape. Numerous
clear
statement
requirements
and
constitutionally derived statutory presumptions exist outside the
federalism area, with the perhaps most prominent example being the
practice of construing statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional
249
concerns. That descriptive fact alone may not be a very satisfying
justification for continuing the practice of advancing constitutional
values through such subconstitutional means, but it is important to
250
recognize what a full-scale rejection of this practice might entail.
A number of normative arguments can also be made in
subconstitutionalism’s defense. It minimizes head-on constitutional
clashes between the Court and the elected branches and potentially
251
offers greater room for constitutional dialogue.
True, clear
statement and other process requirements can pose real obstacles for
Congress, given the difficulty involved in getting new clarifying

249. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2182 (2005) (invoking
the canon that statutes will not be read to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly states
otherwise); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1999) (describing the practice of
construing statutes to avoid constitutional doubts as “beyond debate”); see also Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 105, at 598–628 (documenting numerous examples arising in the form of
clear statement rules and presumptions). See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006) (analyzing invocations of
the avoidance canon within the executive branch).
250. The point can be made even stronger: arguably, all statutory interpretation contains
dimensions of subconstitutionalism, insofar as theories of statutory interpretation are ultimately
rooted to some extent in constitutional values and concerns. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism,
Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 839
(1991). I thank Professor Trevor Morrison for this point.
251. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CAL. L. REV. 399, 452–54 (2005).
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252

legislation enacted. Even so, this impact is less restrictive than direct
judicial invalidation of a measure on constitutional grounds because
253
Congress at least retains the option of reenactment. In addition, a
subconstitutional approach may be better at ensuring that
constitutional values are given weight in governmental
decisionmaking, as courts may be more reluctant to enforce such
values when doing so entails invalidating congressional or executive
254
action. Indeed, the strength of this last point often fuels the attack
on subconstitutionalism as an abuse of judicial authority: courts can
play fast and loose with constitutional review because they do not
have to resolve constitutional challenges decisively or face the full
255
consequences of their constitutional rulings. The persuasiveness of
this critique turns on whether one views underenforcement or
overenforcement of constitutional norms as the prime danger. But it
is hard to insist that subconstitutionalism necessarily enlarges judicial
power beyond proper limits; whether it does so turns a great deal on
factors such as the degree to which the constitutional concerns
invoked by courts are well established, the extent of clarity courts
require from other branches, and judicial transparency and care in
specifying why constitutional concerns are implicated.
What all of this suggests is that subconstitutionalism’s legitimacy
cannot really be established as a general matter; rather, this
determination rests on the particular constitutional values and
256
doctrines at issue.
The question then becomes assessing the
legitimacy of the specific practice of devising special administrative
law doctrines to enforce federalism. This, in turn, implicates two
separate issues: Should federalism values be judicially enforced
252. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 638–40; Manning, supra note 169, at 254–55;
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 94–95.
253. But see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 105 (1997); Schauer,
supra note 252, at 94–95.
254. Frickey, supra note 251, at 455–59; Sunstein, supra note 103, at 337–400 (defending
nondelegation canons despite the lack of direct enforcement of constitutional limits on
delegation); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1593–99 (2000) (defending subconstitutional doctrines
as an appropriate means of enforcing constitutional principles that operate more as resistance
norms than as clear prohibitions on governmental action).
255. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 637; Manning, supra note 169, at 255;
Schauer, supra note 252, at 87–89; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945,
1960–61 (1997).
256. Cf. Manning, supra note 169, at 256 (assessing the canon of constitutional avoidance
specifically as it is used to address nondelegation concerns).
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through subconstitutional means? And if so, is adapting
administrative law in this fashion appropriate, or should the Court
rely on alternative doctrinal mechanisms?
The first of these, whether federalism merits subconstitutional
enforcement, has received substantial attention elsewhere. A number
of scholars have defended a role for the courts in ensuring that
Congress takes state interests seriously, even when Congress has
constitutional authority to trump state regulation or impose burdens
on the states. As a result they have defended judicial imposition of
process requirements, such as clear statement or deliberation
demands, on Congress. Rather than being at odds with reliance on
political safeguards as the central federalism protection, imposition of
such requirements is portrayed as necessary to ensure that Congress
is aware of and adequately considers the federalism implications of its
257
actions. Professor Ernest Young has offered perhaps the most
elaborate justification for process federalism as a supplement to (if
not in lieu of) direct constitutional enforcement of enumerated power
limits. Acknowledging that the Court has little taste for curtailing the
constitutional scope of congressional power, and that such
curtailment ill fits the development of a nationally integrated
economy, Young argues that process federalism represents a justified
attempt to recreate the federalism principle of balance and division
258
between federal and state governments in current realities.
Although no constitutional provision imposes such process

257. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 1323–25, 1425–30; Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 695, 720–22 (1996) (defending process elements of Lopez and arguing for a
judicial approach in which “the serious federalism problems would be addressed through judgecreated techniques of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation”); Gardbaum, supra
note 241, at 795, 799–800; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2240 (1998); Young, supra note 105, at 1358–59.
258. See Young, supra note 93, at 31–32; Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine:
Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1733, 1762–64, 1775–99, 1836 (2005); Young, supra note 4, at 123–31. Professor Young takes an
expansive view of what should count as process federalism, including within that category
“hard” rules that Congress lacks power to remove but that he views as ultimately serving to
enforce political safeguards of federalism, such as the anticommandeering rule. Young, supra
note 4, at 127–28.
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requirements, that is true generally of federalism, which manifests as
259
a background structural principle more than as a clear textual limit.
These arguments demonstrate that, in theory, subconstitutional
federalism can accord well with our constitutional structure. The
more serious concern is that, in practice, operation of federalismbased clarity or deliberation requirements seriously impedes
Congress’s exercise of its enumerated powers and leads to excessive
judicial regulation of the functioning of a coequal branch. Here, an
important point to emphasize is that this concern with illegitimately
burdening Congress is considerably abated when federalism is
enforced through administrative law. As the sextet of decisions
demonstrates, the administrative law framing will often include
scrutiny of congressional action to determine whether Congress
authorized or prohibited a challenged agency action that harms state
260
interests. But such statutory scrutiny occurs within the standard
frameworks applicable to judicial review of agency-administered
statutes and thus avoids imposition of additional procedural
requirements that can create a significant obstacle for Congress to
overcome.
More importantly, unlike Congress, federal administrative
agencies are already required to seek and respond to comments and
261
explain their policy choices. Judicial scrutiny of agency functioning
is a constant and everyday aspect of administrative agency existence,
and courts regularly invalidate agency actions when agency actions
exceed their authority or when agencies have failed to satisfy
procedural requirements or to provide an adequate justification for
their decisions. To be sure, such invalidations can create significant
obstacles for agencies, and attacks on judicial review for ossifying

259. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“Behind the words of
the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”); Young, supra note 258, at
1748, 1754.
260. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916 (2006) (emphasizing the need to
determine if Congress had delegated power to the attorney general to issue the interpretive rule
in question).
261. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49
(1983); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2699–700 (2005) (stating that an agency can change its regulatory approach provided it explains
why). Indeed, the Court’s decisions imposing process-based limits on Congress are often
attacked on the grounds that Congress is not an administrative agency. See Bryant & Simeone,
supra note 246, at 337, 370; Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 246, at 90–91, 97, 120; see also Cross,
supra note 232, at 1331–32.
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agency rulemaking are a well-worn component of the administrative
262
law oeuvre. But the burdens of notice-and-comment rulemaking are
in practice considerably less onerous than bicameralism and
263
presentment. In any event, federalism-inspired requirements seem
unlikely to add significantly to the burdens that agencies already face
in the rulemaking context. And agencies may be better able to
overcome any burdens and costs imposed from such requirements
264
than Congress is.
In their response to this Article, Professors Stuart Benjamin and
Ernest Young contend to the contrary that this agency focus renders
the administrative law approach profoundly illegitimate because the
Constitution requires that choices about the federal-state balance be
265
“meaningfully traceable to Congress.” Much depends on the degree
of clarity that “meaningful traceability” requires. No one disputes
that “an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the
validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until
262. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 232, at 1331–32 (“APA review has been quite destructive of
the regulatory process.”); McGarity, supra note 232, at 1419 (“The predictable result of
stringent ‘hard look’ judicial review of complex rulemaking is ossification.”). But see William
Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
393, 442 (2000) (“[T]he hard look doctrine has not caused a crisis of agency inability to achieve
regulatory goals through informal rulemaking.”); O’Connell, supra note 234, at 964 (stating that
new “empirical findings suggest that the administrative state is not greatly ossified”).
263. See Young, supra note 4, at 69; see also Merrill, supra note 175, at 750 (noting that
agencies face lesser procedural obstacles to acting in the context of concluding that, compared
to Congress and the courts, “[a]gencies are the fast track to preemption”). Indeed, the extent to
which judicial review restricts agency rulemaking is a matter of debate. Compare Jordan, supra
note 262, at 443–44 (arguing that “hard look review” does not “seriously hinder agency
rulemaking efforts,” but conceding that more research is needed to truly understand the impact
of judicial review on agency rulemaking), and O’Connell, supra note 234, at 932 (concluding
from review of data from the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions
that “the procedural costs to rulemaking (from the agency’s perspective) are not so high as to
prohibit considerable rulemaking activity by agencies” but also documenting an increase in
interim rulemaking techniques, which might suggest that traditional notice-and-comment
rulemaking is costly for agencies), with McGarity, supra note 232, at 1387–96, 1400–03, 1410–26
(arguing that judicial review (as well as legislative and executive branch impositions) has
resulted in a significant ossification of rulemaking, with agencies avoiding promulgating new
rules or revisiting existing rules because of the burdens involved), and Pierce, supra note 232, at
60–66 (same).
264. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)
(“[I]t is more difficult for Congress to make its intentions known—for example by amending a
statute—than it is for an agency to amend its regulations or to otherwise indicate its position.”).
265. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2134 (2008).
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Congress confers power upon it.” Indeed, that principle formed the
basis for the decision in Oregon, in which the Court invalidated
Attorney General Ashcroft’s interpretive rule on the grounds that
Congress had not delegated authority to determine what constitutes
267
legitimate medical practice to the attorney general. More generally,
the dominance of questions of statutory interpretation in the
federalism–administrative law sextet demonstrates that Congress is
far from absent under the administrative law approach,
notwithstanding this approach’s primary focus on agencies. Statutory
scrutiny under Chevron’s step zero and step one—at times, as noted
268
in Part II.C, quite searching scrutiny —ensures that agency
impositions on the states reflect congressional intent. Thus,
administrative law enforcement of federalism does not lose the
political safeguards justification that animates process federalism, but
instead amplifies the political safeguards available by giving weight to
states in executive branch policy debates and by rendering the effects
of agency decisions more transparent and more amenable to
269
congressional oversight.
What the administrative law approach does not demand is a clear
statement rule to the effect that Congress must clearly authorize
burdens that administrative agencies impose on the states. But
demanding clear or express congressional authorization for specific
agency actions goes well beyond simply requiring that choices about
the appropriate federal-state balance be made by—or be
meaningfully traceable to—Congress. Moreover, any claim that
federalism-based clear statement doctrines are constitutionally
mandated, as opposed to simply constitutionally justified, is quite

266. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 2097, 2109 (2004) (“[I]t is hornbook law among administrative lawyers that ‘an agency has
the power to issue binding legislative rules only if and to the extent Congress has authorized it
to do so.’” (quoting 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 6.3, at 234 (3d ed. 1994)). Embodied in this requirement of congressional
delegation is “an anti-inherency principle . . . that agencies have no inherent authority to act
with the force of law.” Id. at 2109. My discussion here leaves to the side the question of whether
and to what extent the president has any inherent lawmaking authority, and thus whether in
some contexts agencies might be able to act based solely on presidential delegation.
267. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916 (2006).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 151–65.
269. See supra text accompanying note 220.
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contentious. Current nondelegation doctrine establishes that such
specification by Congress is not thought generally required to respect
Congress’s constitutional role—far from it.
Thus, the claim that the administrative law approach is at odds
271
with the Constitution misses its mark. In fact, this approach is
arguably more consistent with constitutional federalism principles
than doctrinal rubrics that seek to give trumping priority to either
national or state interests. As discussed earlier in this Section,
federalism concerns retain validity even when the federal government
272
acts within its constitutional powers. Yet according state interests
trumping priority may unduly underweigh the national side of the
constitutional equation by erecting too great a burden for the federal
government to overcome in seeking to exercise its constitutional
powers. By contrast, the administrative law approach insists on the
need to take account of both national and state interests in
administrative contexts. State interests are given weight, but through
an administrative law framework that also allows for consideration of
other relevant factors. This seems not only more reflective of the
national-state balance that informs the constitution, but also more in
keeping with Congress’s likely intent in enacting the regulatory
scheme at issue.
A final objection to using administrative law to advance
federalism concerns is more straightforwardly normative. It
challenges the idea that state regulation per se adds value to national
policy. From this perspective, the relevant issue for agencies should
be simply designing the best national policy for a given regulatory
context. If a decentralized approach is the most appropriate, then
state regulation (perhaps pursuant to national standards) may have a
role to play. But preserving state regulatory authority deserves no
273
weight independent of such a beneficial impact on policy.
270. Indeed, Professors Benjamin and Young candidly acknowledge that they themselves
disagree on the appropriateness of such clear statement rules. See Benjamin & Young, supra
note 265, at 2148.
271. I am, however, deeply indebted to Professors Benjamin and Young for showing me that
poetry and administrative law can be linked. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 265, at 2114.
272. See supra notes 257–59.
273. Cf. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1949 (emphasizing that the relevant focus
should be on “improving the regulatory process, not the preservation of state regulatory
prerogatives per se”); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism,
Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2, at 166, 167–69,
173, 175, 179 (noting a lack of constitutional justification for privileging state regulation across
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Underlying this view is often suspicion of state regulation as creating
opportunities for parochialism, as well as skepticism that federalism
in fact yields the advantages of experimentation, diversity, and liberty
274
enhancement often invoked on its behalf.
This objection can be faulted for failing to appreciate the
constitutional underpinnings for preserving a state regulatory role,
and for its dim view of the value of state regulation. But it also fails
on its own pragmatic and functionalist terms because it does not
adequately acknowledge the continued relevance that federalism has
for the courts. The disappearance of meaningful judicially enforced
constitutional restrictions on the scope of federal regulatory authority
has not meant the disappearance of judicial concern with preserving
state authority. From a pragmatic perspective, the question therefore
is not whether to protect state regulatory authority, but rather how to
do so. Moreover, an administrative law approach would seem more
attractive to those concerned with achieving the best policy outcome
in specific contexts than the alternative of subconstitutional
federalism doctrines. Instead of across-the-board restrictions, such as
presumptions against preemption or clear statement requirements, an
administrative law analysis focuses on the specifics of a statutory
scheme and on how well an agency justifies a burden it is imposing on
the states. As a result, it allows agencies greater leeway to advance
their understanding of the best federal-state regulatory mix in a given
area.
IV. ENHANCING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS
AS A FEDERALISM VEHICLE
This defense of using administrative law as a vehicle for
addressing federalism concerns holds implications for the Court’s
future jurisprudence. One central implication is that the Court should
apply administrative law doctrines with an eye toward reinforcing
agency attentiveness to state interests in regulatory autonomy.
Another is that addressing federalism concerns through ordinary

the board and advocating a subject-matter-specific default-rule approach that would identify
instances in which values of uniformity should have priority).
274. For a classic statement of arguments against federalism, see Edward Rubin & Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 927–52 (1994). For
responses, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 380–406 (1997);
Jackson, supra note 257, at 2216–23.
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administrative law may often prove more effective than devising
special federalism-inspired doctrines. Perhaps most importantly, the
Court must discuss much more openly how federalism should factor
into agency decisionmaking and judicial review if it intends
administrative law to include a federalism component.
A. Reinforcing Agency Attentiveness to State Interests
One implication of the foregoing analysis is that the Court should
seek to reinforce agency incentives to take state regulatory interests
into account. To some extent, the federalism–administrative law
sextet does this. For example, Massachusetts’s “special solicitude for
the states” in standing analysis makes it more likely that federal
agencies will face federal court litigation by states who disagree with
the result of administrative proceedings. As a result, agencies may
well become more attentive to state interests in the course of
administrative proceedings, whether in the hope of reaching
compromises that would allay state suits or with an eye toward
judicial review and the need to demonstrate that state concerns were
adequately considered. In addition, a theme that emerges from the
decisions read as a whole is that the absence of careful agency
consideration of state interests may make searching judicial scrutiny
more likely. To contrast ADEC and Oregon: limited federal trumping
of the states will receive more deference than wholesale overruling,
particularly when the circumstances of agency decisionmaking signal
275
that ideology and politics rather than expertise were at work. Yet
the impact of these decisions on agency behavior is likely to be muted
as a result of their fact-dependent character and the Court’s failure to
articulate a more general account of why agencies need to take state
interests seriously.
The Court’s jurisprudence to date is additionally deficient in two
key areas: developing the federalism-reinforcing potential of
administrative procedure, and insisting that agencies better justify
and explain decisions and policies that intrude significantly on state
regulatory endeavors.
1. Federalism and Administrative Procedure. As mentioned,
although procedures surface in several decisions, their precise role in

275. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 93–96.
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the Court’s analysis is never clearly identified. This omission is
particularly unfortunate given that administrative procedure may
offer important protection for state interests for the reasons described
in Part III.A. Greater empirical evidence that administrative
procedure in fact serves this role would be desirable. But if it does,
one option for strengthening administrative law’s role as a federalism
vehicle would be to enhance procedural protections accorded states.
A move by the courts to impose new procedural obligations on
their own initiative would encounter significant doctrinal obstacles, in
the form of the Court’s instruction in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
277
Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council
that “[a]bsent
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the
‘administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of
278
procedure.’” Yet Vermont Yankee’s prohibition on new judicial
procedural impositions leaves courts free to enforce the procedural
requirements contained in statutes and agency rules, an escape hatch
courts have exploited by crafting expansive interpretations of the
279
procedural mandates contained in the APA. Such a route seems
equally available here, as courts could strengthen administrative law’s
sensitivity to federalism through vigorous enforcement of the APA’s
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking and other statutory
procedural requirements. For example, courts could relax their
substantive scrutiny when agencies utilized procedures (whether
notice-and-comment rulemaking or other measures) intended to
ensure adequate attention to state interests, thereby creating
incentives for agencies to impose such procedural requirements on
280
themselves. In addition, courts could police the distinction between
276. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30.
277. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
278. Id. at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, it is possible to justify new
judicial procedural impositions on the ground that constitutional federalism values should
outweigh or at least temper the separation of powers and functional considerations that led the
Court in Vermont Yankee to reject judicial development of administrative procedure. See id. at
546–48. Such new procedural requirements would represent a form of special federalisminspired administrative law.
279. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial
Review and Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 124, 126 (Peter L. Strauss ed.,
2006).
280. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 256–57 (recommending the imposition of consultation and
notice-and-comment requirements in administrative preemption contexts); Matthew C.
Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and
Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 552–53 (2006).
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legislative and nonlegislative rules tightly, insisting on notice-andcomment procedures whenever an agency interpretive rule or policy
281
statement had significant legal or practical effect on a state.
Alternatively, courts could strictly enforce notice and explanation
requirements, requiring that federal agencies carefully identify and
justify the preemptive or other effects of a proposed rule on the
states. This latter option could have considerable practical relevance
today. Some agencies recently have included statements in their
explanation of final rules stating that they viewed the rules as broadly
preempting state regulation and tort actions, despite having initially
stated in the proposed rule notice that the rules would not be
282
preemptive or would preempt more narrowly. Arguably, such
position changes on preemption made the original notices
inadequate, because the final rules were not a “logical outgrowth” of
283
the proposed rule. Or, even if standard notice requirements were

281. Given the lack of a clear doctrinal distinction between these two types of rules, see
John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 915–27 (2004), such an
approach would not require much by way of change in current practice, and, though not directly
judicially enforceable, similar notice-and-comment requirements are imposed by executive
order, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 206, 209–10 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (2006); Exec. Order No. 12,988 § 3(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 157 (1996), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(2000). Arguably, increased court policing of this kind would have offered yet another basis for
invalidating the interpretive (nonlegislative) rule in Oregon given the significant legal effects—
loss of license or criminal punishment—the rule imposed on doctors who used controlled
substances to assist suicide, and the practical nullification of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act
that the rule would have effected.
282. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254 (describing the FDA’s inclusion of a broad
preemption statement in a recent prescription drug labeling rule, despite having initially stated
in the notice of proposed rulemaking that the rule would not be preemptive); compare Final
Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472,
13,496–97 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633) (stating that the CPSC rule would
preempt all inconsistent state standards and requirements, including court-created requirements
imposed through tort suits), with Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Standard for the
Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,470, 2,493 (Jan. 13, 2005) (stating
that the proposed rule would preempt “non-identical state or local mattress flammability
standards” and not indicating that the rule would preempt common law tort actions).
283. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2351 (2007) (describing
the “logical outgrowth” requirement as “one of fair notice”). It could be argued that states and
other commentators nonetheless had “fair notice” that the agencies were considering
preemption. See id. (finding no notice violation when an agency changed position during
rulemaking on the substantive scope of a rule). But the fact that the rules in question here were
addressed to substantive topics other than preemption makes that conclusion harder to justify.
Indeed, the fact that preemption is addressed solely in the preambles of these rules complicates
assessment of whether failure to provide adequate notice of preemption would make the final
rules invalid or simply would justify a court in failing to grant Chevron deference to the agency’s
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satisfied in these instances, courts might conclude that additional
notice is required before a federal rule can have a preemptive effect,
284
at least when state law is not plainly in conflict with the rule.
2. Greater Scrutiny of Agency Decisions that Burden State
Interests. A second technique for protecting state interests, this time
more evident in the six decisions, is subjecting agency decisions that
burden state interests to greater substantive scrutiny than usually
applied. Interestingly, the form in which this technique most clearly
appears in the decisions—specifically, the Court’s use of independent
scrutiny of statutory meaning—may be most problematic from an
agency-incentivizing perspective. After all, why should agencies pay
careful heed to federalism concerns in interpreting statutes if courts
285
are unlikely to defer to their decisions? That said, lack of such
scrutiny—and instead willingness to apply strong Chevron deference
to agency interpretations that significantly displace state authority—
could remove a powerful check on federal agency overreaching at the
states’ expense. For this reason, as noted, some scholars have argued
against granting any deference to agency statutory interpretations
that preempt state action or at most granting lesser Skidmore
286
deference.
More beneficial, I believe, would be to approach the question
from a perspective that emphasizes the quality of agency reasoning

position on preemption; the latter would seem the correct result as an agencies’ failure to
include a statement on preemption in the body of the rule suggests it does not intend such
statements to have legal force and effect. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001); Sharkey, supra note 3, at 257–58; Sharkey, supra note 176, at 496–97.
284. Preemption of state law that actually conflicts with federal regulations is not
contentious; what has sparked substantial debate is instead efforts to preempt state laws not
directly in conflict on the grounds that they create an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme
(as in Watters), or more rarely, that federal regulation indicates an intent to occupy the field. See
Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 175, at 695; see also supra
note 108 and accompanying text (noting an increase in findings of obstacle preemption).
285. Even the adoption of Skidmore may have such a deterrent effect, given that Skidmore
ties deference to the degree to which an agency has succeeded in persuading a court that the
agency’s view is correct and thus in practice may not differ much from independent scrutiny.
But as Skidmore emphasizes the quality and reliability of agency decisions in deciding whether
to defer, adoption of Skidmore as the standard under which to review agency preemption
decisions seems better keyed to influencing agency decisionmaking than simply substituting
independent judicial review.
286. See sources cited supra note 176.
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Agencies should face a greater burden of
and explanation.
persuasion and explanation when their decisions substantially restrict
state experimentation and traditional state functions. The doctrinal
rubric most amenable to such an approach is arbitrary and
capriciousness review, in part because it applies to all agency
decisionmaking, whether involving matters of statutory interpretation
or more straightforward policy setting. As a result, it avoids the odd
dichotomy of denying deference to agency preemption
interpretations yet reviewing agency substantive determinations quite
deferentially, notwithstanding that the latter can impact the states as
harshly. Arbitrary and capriciousness review also seems particularly
well suited to curbing agency decisions that are unduly driven by
288
executive branch politics at the expense of governing statutes.
The downside of relying on arbitrary and capriciousness review is
that the impact on agency decisionmaking is harder to cabin.
Agencies make a multitude of policy and implementation decisions
that burden the states, far more than the number of preemptive
interpretations they may issue. Imposing a greater justificatory
burden when agency decisions impact negatively on state interests
would create a substantial counterbalance to any tendency on the part
of federal agencies to underweigh state interests. But arguably it does
so by tilting the scales too much in favor of the states, at least if
applied across the board, undermining the important uniformity and
expertise benefits that federal regulation can offer and that Congress
may have sought to achieve by delegating implementation
289
responsibility to an administrative agency. This is not simply a
question of national interests versus state interests, because national
regulation can reinforce state authority by protecting states against

287. Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld also identify their preferred approach for
ensuring agencies take state interests adequately into account as a species of hard look review.
See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2001–02 (“[T]he solution is that the appropriate level
of deference is something of an amalgam of Skidmore and hard look review.”). Kenneth
Bamberger has similarly advocated that courts use review of the reasonableness of agency
determinations to ensure adequate agency consideration of general normative concerns, such as
federalism, although he locates Chevron step two as the appropriate doctrinal home for such
review. See Bamberger, supra note 178 (manuscript at 46–57).
288. It has been used in this way before. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40–44 (1983).
289. Cf. Schapiro, supra note 241, at 288–93 (discussing potential harms as well as benefits of
concurrent federal and state regulation).
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harmful externalities caused by sister state regulation (or lack
290
thereof).
As a result, a contextual approach appears more appropriate,
with greater justification perhaps required only in some
circumstances—for example, when the burden on states is quite
significant, or when governing statutes and historical practice have
291
long tolerated a substantial role for state regulation. Here another
advantage of the arbitrary and capriciousness review comes to fore,
which is that such review already encompasses a broad range of
scrutiny. As Professor Peter Strauss has noted, searching hard look
scrutiny is more common with respect to notice-and-comment
rulemakings, which produce generally applicable standards, than in
292
less consequential informal adjudications. This particular pattern of
scrutiny appears less appropriate in instances when agency actions
significantly impact the states; given the potential federalism benefits
that may accrue from use of notice-and-comment procedures, it
would be odd to subject agency decisionmaking burdening the states
outside those procedures to lesser review. But the fact that such
variation already exists demonstrates the possibility of tailoring
arbitrary and capricious review to federalism concerns.
Interestingly, this is the approach implicitly suggested but never
developed in Raich, and medical marijuana represents a prime
context for its application. In light of strong state commitment to
290. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 108, at 1370–71; Merrill, supra note 273, at 173–
76.
291. See Bamberger, supra 178 (manuscript at 43); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at
2019–20. For arguments regarding the importance of a contextual approach to federalism, see
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 114–20
(2005); Merrill, supra note 273, at 166, 167–68; Sharkey, supra note 176, at 514 (“Courts should
scrutinize the regulatory process itself, relying on the FDA as a source of relevant information
regarding the precise contours of the risks that it has considered.”).
292. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or ‘The Deciders’?: The Courts in Administrative Law,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1031822. Compare, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (hard look review in
informal rulemaking), with Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 645–47
(1990) (deferential review in informal adjudication context), and Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 101–04 (1983) (greater deference in light of
uncertainty). Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein’s recent empirical analysis of
arbitrariness review supports this claim that arbitrary and capriciousness review encompasses a
range of scrutiny, although they trace this variation to the ideology of the reviewing judges and
the ideological content of the underlying decisions. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089076.
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experimenting with medical marijuana, and the CSA’s provision for
rescheduling of controlled substances based on medical purpose, the
federal government should face a significant justificatory burden if it
refuses to relist marijuana or undertake a sustained investigation of a
293
rescheduling petition. Another context in which greater scrutiny
might be appropriate concerns federal agency denial of state waiver
294
requests. Waiver requests are often reviewed quite deferentially,
but greater scrutiny appears warranted when waiver authority is
sought by a state and the waiver denial significantly restricts state
295
regulatory autonomy.
B. Ordinary or Extraordinary Administrative Law?
A final issue concerns whether administrative law’s federalism
potential is best enhanced by developing special requirements
applicable only when agency action impacts state interests, or instead
by seeking to protect state interests from within the paradigms of
ordinary administrative law. Given the capaciousness of ordinary
federal administrative law, such special federalism-inspired rules do
not seem necessary. Neither of the two proposals advanced in the
preceding Section, for example, necessarily requires going outside of
the paradigms of ordinary administrative law. Moreover, developing
an extraordinary administrative law for federalism contexts may in
fact undermine administrative law’s federalism potential insofar as it
suggests that federalism concerns are not a legitimate focus of
ordinary administrative law. Equally concerning, devising special
federalism-inspired rules could erode the normalizing aspect of the
administrative law approach, transforming it into something more

293. Cf. Young, supra note 93, at 33–37. A petition seeking such rescheduling appears to
have been pending with the Drug Enforcement Agency since 2004, and an effort under the
Information Quality Act to force HHS to correct information it provided on marijuana was
recently dismissed on the ground that the Act is not judicially enforceable. Ams for Safe Access
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. C 07-01049 WHA, 2007 WL 4168511 at *2, *4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007).
294. See, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1996); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC,
162 F.3d 1215, 1222, 1224–25 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
295. Such an approach could be relevant to several disputes in which the federal
government has denied state waiver requests with important federalism implications. See, e.g.,
Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 494–95 (D. Conn. 2006) (challenging denial of
waiver under the No Child Left Behind Act); see also supra note 53 (discussing the EPA’s
denial of waiver to California under section 209 of the CAA).
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exceptional like constitutional or subconstitutional federalism
doctrines.
The practical import of this caution against developing
extraordinary administrative law doctrines is limited. The distinction
between extraordinary and ordinary administrative law is far from
bright-line. Most importantly, staying within the broad confines of
ordinary administrative law does not mean foregoing express
invocation of federalism concerns in administrative law decisions.
Indeed, express acknowledgment of the need for agencies to seriously
consider state regulatory interests is essential for administrative law
to fulfill its federalism role, as well as needed for judicial
accountability and agency-court dialogue more generally. A practice
of vindicating state regulatory interests only tacitly is too easily
discarded and too hidden to clearly instruct agencies or lower courts.
Unless the Supreme Court is explicit about administrative law’s role
as a federalism vehicle, the traditional view of these doctrines as
analytically separate may make lower courts resistant to injecting
federalism concerns into administrative law analysis.
In some ways, the federalism–administrative law sextet accords
with this caution against developing extraordinary administrative law.
As discussed above, ordinary administrative law surfaces in all the
decisions and none of the decisions, even Massachusetts, is necessarily
beyond standard administrative law fare. But the decisions fail
significantly on the factor of transparency. Even when the Court
emphasized the impact of federal administrative decisions on the
states, it offered little clarity on how that impact factored into its
analysis. As a result, lower courts and agencies are left without much
guidance on how to approach intersections of federalism and
administrative law.
Greater acknowledgment of the connection between federalism
and administrative law is as important from an administrative law
perspective as from a federalism one. The sextet of decisions indicates
that, faced with federalism concerns, the Court may apply more
searching scrutiny and in other ways push ordinary administrative law
to extremes. From an administrative law perspective, the danger is
that these more extreme approaches will spill over into contexts in
which federalism concerns are absent. And the more frequently they
are invoked, the more these approaches move from the margin to the
core of established administrative law analysis. The net effect might
be a general erosion of the deference accorded agency
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determinations, not limited to contexts that implicate state regulatory
interests. This suggests that, viewed purely from an agency-centered
standpoint, developing special requirements limited to federalism
contexts might be preferable to reliance on ordinary administrative
law to address federalism concerns. But at a minimum, express
discussion of how federalism concerns factor into a court’s application
of ordinary administrative law requirements is important to limit such
spillover effects.
CONCLUSION
Federalism and federal administrative law are increasingly
intersecting. Indeed, given the breadth of Congress’s constitutional
powers today, the future of federalism lies in integrating protections
for the states into agency deliberations and judicial review of agency
action. Until recently, the relationship between federalism and
administrative law had not received the judicial and academic
attention it deserves. That omission may be changing. As I have
argued here, the Supreme Court may be using administrative law as a
means of addressing federalism concerns, and at a minimum is
becoming more aware of the intersections between these two
doctrinal areas. That development, I believe, is an auspicious one, as
administrative law has significant potential to advance state interests
within the framework of the national administrative state.
In the end, however, ensuring federalism’s continuing relevance
within the world of administrative governance turns as much on
creation of regulatory regimes that emphasize a continuing state
regulatory role as on doctrinal adaptation. Using administrative law,
the courts can ensure that federal agencies give due weight to
considering state interests. But administrative law doctrine can only
take federalism so far. Ultimately, the success of efforts to integrate
federalism and the modern federal administrative state hinges on
agencies—and their political masters in the executive branch and
Congress—being willing to trade off some degree of uniformity for
the benefits of diversity, experimentation, and localism in setting
296
regulatory policy.

296. For interesting efforts at identifying when such trade-offs may be merited, see Robert
B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 914–26 (2006); Buzbee, supra note 3,
at 1599–613; Merrill, supra note 273, at 22–33.

